(Cross-posted from the Accountable Strategies blog)
The book points out that that the Big Dig, in particular, suffered from a range of managerial issues common to public projects in which key managerial functions have been privatized. For instance, the state of Massachusetts relied on Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff, the private-sector design and construction manager of the Big Dig, to undertake much of the project’s preliminary and even some final design work, oversee construction contracts, and supervise its own work. Similarly, in Iraq, the U.S. Agency for International Development used the Bechtel Corp. both as a project manager and primary contractor. Accountability and cost issues resulted in both instances.
The book also discusses quality problems on the Big Dig, in Iraq, and in many other public projects that have resulted from a desire to meet schedule goals without undertaking proper planning or adhering to what have often been traditional internal control practices. The Big Dig, for instance, was plagued by a practice of proceeding with incomplete and inaccurate designs in an attempt to avoid schedule delays.
Similarly, in Iraq, one cost-plus contract with Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR) contained more than $200 million in questionable costs because task orders and specifications were not even negotiated until six months after construction began on projects to restore Iraq’s oil infrastructure.
The book discusses a number of successful public projects as well, such as the development of a new information technology system in the City of Seattle and the recent construction of a new public library in the Town of Harvard, Massachusetts, which were completed on time and within budget. While the projects discussed in the book vary widely in scope and cost and were undertaken at all levels of government, my intent was to distill management practices that are common to successful projects as well as to projects that are problematic or unsuccessful.
The purpose of the book isn’t to assign blame, but rather to give public managers new tools to cope with downsized staffs and related problems and to bring their projects to successful conclusions.
And very timely, too, I might add. Don’t give away the ending, but is Charlie “Smartest Guy in Government” Baker in it? I remember him having a role in that “downsizing”.
Charlie is not mentioned, but his former boss is. Can’t give away anymore than that!
Is your thesis that government should directly take over the design and construction of major public works project. That didn’t even happen in the hey day of public works projects. The major (monster) public buildings in Washington were designed by outside architects, the US government didn’t even want to take the project on with in house staff and changed the law so outside architects could.
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p>The big dig just seemed like a big managerial mess. I’m still waiting for someone to be professionally rebuked for allowing the design of the concrete ceiling panels.
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p>Massachusetts construction law is a mess though some of the public agencies (umass for instance) seem to be able to get building built on time with quality contractors but they are exempt from some of the more onerous laws.
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p>A start would be for someone to repeal the filed sub-bid law.
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… situation where a government takes over the Construction Management on major projects. They certainly don’t take over design services. I’d argue (and have argued) that overall the state got value for its money. If I offered to give you $19B back but everything goes back the way it was you’d be a fool to take it. Now, whether we could afford it is a different issue.
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p>What happened with regard to cost on the big dig was scope creep. For whatever reason, the state didn’t go around advertising the true costs of the project as the scope expanded and then acted all surprised. All I heard about was the overruns went from 2B to 14B on the news. Sounds bad, but the state was aware of the 14.7B figure since 1993. That they didn’t find it politically advantageous to repeat that figure in the press isn’t very surprising. But they asked for the work to be done and it got done.
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p>As for inaccurate designs, it really needs to be understood that during preliminary design the effort to go and confirm that field conditions reflect as-built and record drawings of previous work can only go so far. Invariably, especially in a city as old as Boston, when you get to the point of actually doing the digging during construction, you find stuff that you didn’t expect. That is reality no mater who is in the oversight seat, so as a ding it is quite unfair.
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p>Indeed, decent sized chunk of the dig (I’d guess around 7B) was straightening out all the spaghetti (underground utilities – electrical, sewer, waste-water, water, etc.) that was a positive mess. Indeed it was a good thing that we got ahead of that aging infrastructure while we were ‘under the hood’ as it were because dealing with it later always winds up costing more.
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p>Now, by contrast, the KBR work in Iraq didn’t happen with anyone doing Construction Management Services. And they certainly didn’t do any real ‘while we’re under the hood it would be stupid to leave x undone’ type of stuff.
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p>All that said, I look forward to your book. I just hope your thesis, premises, and conclusions reflect the above considerations.
take over management functions from government, not construction functions per se. The handoff of management functions happened on the Big Dig and it happened extensively in Iraq. It has also happened on a number of Defense Department weapons and satellite projects, and the results haven’t been good.
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p>I’ll look forward to your comments about the book.
Are you talking about the Design Review Boards?
“inherently governmental functions.” The performance of inherently governmental functions by contractors happened in a number of instances in Iraq, according to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. These functions inlcude such things as approving contract change orders, or “defining requirements” on projects.
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p>But it’s not only in Iraq that this happens. The GAO found that in one case involving a satellite development program, public management agencies took a backseat to the contractor, which ran the project team meetings.
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p>On the Big Dig, Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff was in charge of both preparing and overseeing design work as well as overseeing construction. The Massachusetts Inspector General noted that B/PB’s scope of work was so inclusive it raised a number of potential conflicts of interest. B/PB also had authority to approve some project change orders. All of this blurred lines of authority and accountability, and left it unclear who was really in charge of the Big Dig.
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p>When we talk about changing the “Big Dig culture,” I think we really have to look at the relationships between the public sector and its contractors. The governor can reorganize the Transportation Department as much as he wants; but nothing will really change until the government firmly establishes its control over major public projects.
Forget where I read this, but I recall reading that, in a Scandinavian country, it was possible and honorable to have a long and distinguished career entirely within government. I think the reference was to bank regulation. Here, work in the government doesn’t pay as well, isn’t as well-respected, and has a reputation for being unchallenging and mind-numbing.
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p>It’d seem to me that hiring private contractors to dig bigly would require a bunch of professionalism and expertise on the contracting side that just wasn’t there.
Saw the price and gasped a little, but given the amount of work that seems to have gone into it based on your comments I am going to presume it it worth the money. I have asked if it is available on Kindle as that is my preferred way of reading books these days.
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p>I would ask if you have considered how much is the result of downsizing versus how much may be the result of a change in the skill sets needed to oversee these large projects? You can see changes happen in many industries where the ways that had previously worked very well are replaced by a shift in the business. This shift can come from many factors such as technology, business practices (JIT for example), competition, etc. In many of these cases the people doing the jobs either learn the new techniques and continue to perform in the new role or move on to other responsibilities. I am not sure how much movement happens in public employ where seniority is valued and job turnover relatively lower than in the private sector. Again not sure if this plays into it or if it is in your book.
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p>And, if you can get it on the Kindle that would be great.
I do discuss the need for new and more sophisticated skills for public managers. In many cases, the traditional hierarchical management systems that exist in most public agencies will not work as well as more flexible “adhocracies” and other arrangements that have been around in the private sector for some time. These are areas where government can learn from the private sector, and I discuss a number of them. At the same time, I try to make it clear that this doesn’t mean government can simply hand off its managerial responsibilities to the private sector–the so-called “wake me when it’s over” syndrome, which happens all too often.
ConsEph, I have no contact for you, so I’ll note here that I asked the marketing person at CRC Press about putting my book on Kindle. The answer is maybe. He’s looking into it.
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p>Also, the head of CRC Press said this past weekend at a conference I attended that he doesn’t view Kindle as a source of a lot of sales. That surprised me, since I thought Kindle was the start of a revolution in how books are read. But apparently not every publisher sees it that way yet.
and good luck with the book. I look forward to reading it.
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p>It is a timely subject. Downsizing and privatizing of government functions seems to be happening everywhere. Its not a popular notion, but there are some things the government does better, there are some functions the government should retain, and should probably enhance.
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p>I worked for the federal government for quite a while. It was not in the big public construction project side of things but most of government operates in the same way regardless of the functions.
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p>I worked in the defense department side of things. Specifically in a defense contractors plant. That office performed oversight (“watch dogs”) of program management, contracting, manufacturing, engineering and quality assurance of the design, development and acquisition of major weapon systems. The function of the office was to ensure the government got what it contracted for, the product did what it was supposed to and was delivered on time at the agreed to price. In reality, the development and acquisition of weapon systems are large government projects that take years to design and develop and continue on for years when they reach the production phase.
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p>The office was continually plagued by staff reductions. I was “downsized” from that office by a general reduction in the overall “watchdog” segment of government and an increase in the trend in trusting the industry to police itself I’m sure you have heard of the famous stories of the $600 hammer, or $1000 wrench, etc. and wondered how that happens.
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p>Government itself can not build the “Big Dig” without the expertise of the construction industry nor can it build weapon systems without the experts in that industry but it can and should maintain control of those projects, through traditional oversight practices, to make sure taxpayers get what they pay for. The two entities are at cross purposes (or they should be) and the purposes have to remain separated or you get a tunnel that leaks or a hammer that costs $600.
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p>I look forward to your research and the read.
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Given your experience in project oversight in the DoD, Surrette, I greatly look forward to your comments about the book.