The basic problem with Truman’s attempt to seize the steel mills was that they were privately owned, and he had no congressional authority to do what he did. In fact, there were Acts of Congress that would have allowed Truman to seize the mills, but he did not comply with the procedures set forth in those laws – “The Government refers to the seizure provisions of one of these statutes … as ‘much too cumbersome, involved, and time-consuming for the crisis which was at hand.'” Truman relied, instead, on the inherent power of his office under Article II of the Constitution. (Sound familiar yet? Just wait.) Here are the relevant portions of Truman’s Executive Order, as reprinted in the Supreme Court’s opinion:
Directing the Secretary of commerce to Take Possession of and Operate the Plants and Facilities of Certain Steel Companies
WHEREAS on December 16, 1950, I proclaimed the existence of a national emergency which requires that the military, naval, air, and civilian defenses of this country be strengthened as speedily as possible to the end that we may be able to repel any and all threats against our national security and to fulfill our responsibilities in the efforts being made throughout the United Nations and otherwise to bring about a lasting peace; and
WHEREAS American fighting men and fighting men of other nations of the United Nations are now engaged in deadly combat with the forces of aggression in Korea, and forces of the United States are stationed elsewhere overseas for the purpose of participating in the defense of the Atlantic Community against aggression; and
WHEREAS the weapons and other materials needed by our armed forces and by those joined with us in the defense of the free world are produced to a great extent in this country, and steel is an indispensable component of substantially all of such weapons and materials; and
WHEREAS steel is likewise indispensable to the carrying out of programs of the Atomic Energy Commission of vital importance to our defense efforts; and
WHEREAS a continuing and uninterrupted supply of steel is also indispensable to the maintenance of the economy of the United States, upon which our military strength depends; and
WHEREAS a controversy has arisen between certain companies in the United States producing and fabricating steel and the elements thereof and certain of their workers represented by the United Steel Workers of America, CIO, regarding terms and conditions of employment; and
WHEREAS the controversy has not been settled through the processes of collective bargaining or through the efforts of the Government, … and a strike has been called for 12:01 A. M., April 9, 1952; and
WHEREAS a work stoppage would immediately jeopardize and imperil our national defense and the defense of those joined with us in resisting aggression, and would add to the continuing danger of our soldiers, sailors, and airmen engaged in combat in the field; and
WHEREAS in order to assure the continued availability of steel and steel products during the existing emergency, it is necessary that the United States take possession of and operate the plants, facilities, and other property of the said companies as hereinafter provided:
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:
1. The Secretary of Commerce is hereby authorized and directed to take possession of all or such of the plants, facilities, and other property of the companies named in the list attached hereto, or any part thereof, as he may deem necessary in the interests of national defense; and to operate or to arrange for the operation thereof and to do all things necessary for, or incidental to, such operation.
* * *
6. Whenever in the judgment of the Secretary of Commerce further possession and operation by him of any plant, facility, or other property is no longer necessary or expedient in the interest of national defense, and the Secretary has reason to believe that effective future operation is assured, he shall return the possession and operation of such plant, facility, or other property to the company in possession and control thereof at the time possession was taken under this order.
* * *
Harry S. Truman.
The White House, April 8, 1952.
The Supreme Court rejected Truman’s position by a 6-3 vote. Justice Black’s Opinion of the Court uses language that strikes me as remarkably applicable today:
Justice Jackson’s famous concurring opinion then laid out a three-part framework for evaluating executive action – a framework that applies with remarkable precision to the Bush/NSA matter:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government, as an undivided whole, lacks power. A seizure executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least, as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables, rather than on abstract theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.
Jackson then concluded that Truman’s action fell within the third category, because Congress had directly spoken to the seizure of private property and Truman’s actions were inconsistent with what Congress had said. Among the pertinent portions of Jackson’s opinion:
s can grant and has granted large emergency powers, certainly ample to embrace this crisis, I am quite unimpressed with the argument that we should affirm possession of them without statute. Such power either has no beginning or it has no end. If it exists, it need submit to no legal restraint. I am not alarmed that it would plunge us straightway into dictatorship, but it is at least a step in that wrong direction.
Jackson concluded his opinion:
Such institutions may be destined to pass away. But it is the duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give them up.
Could it be any clearer? Congress has spoken directly to the need for exactly the type of secret wiretapping that the NSA carried out: it passed a law (the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or FISA), it created a secret court, and it even allowed the President to order wiretaps without a warrant as long as he retroactively sought one from the secret court within 72 hours – not too much of a burden. President Bush acted in total disregard of the FISA. His actions therefore fall within Jackson’s third category, in which “his power is at its lowest ebb.” His actions were legal only if Congress is “disabl[ed]” from “acting on the subject,” which they clearly are not. QED, it seems to me.
Also instructive is the dissenting opinion in the Youngstown case, which made arguments strikingly similar to what Bush has been saying over the last few days:
He illustrated by showing that 84% of the national production of certain alloy steel is currently used for production of military-end items and that 35% of total production of another form of steel goes into ammunition, 80% of such ammunition now going to Korea. The Secretary of Defense stated that: “We are holding the line [in Korea] with ammunition, and not with the lives of our troops.” …
Our soldiers and our allies will hardly be cheered with the assurance that the ammunition upon which their lives depend will be forthcoming — “sooner or later,” or, in other words, “too little and too late.” Accordingly, if the President has any power under the Constitution to meet a critical situation in the absence of express statutory authorization, there is no basis whatever for criticizing the exercise of such power in this case.
* * *
Under [plaintiffs’] view, the President is left powerless at the very moment when the need for action may be most pressing and when no one, other than he, is immediately capable of action. Under this view, he is left powerless because a power not expressly given to Congress is nevertheless found to rest exclusively with Congress.
* * *
We are not called upon today to expand the Constitution to meet a new situation. For, in this case, we need only look to history and time-honored principles of constitutional law — principles that have been applied consistently by all branches of the Government throughout our history. It is those who assert the invalidity of the Executive Order who seek to amend the Constitution in this case.
* * *
The Framers knew, as we should know in these times of peril, that there is real danger in Executive weakness.
Comforting words for President Bush – except that they only commanded three votes.
the Globe has a piece on this exact case today and ties it to the debate going on now.
I hadn’t seen that article.
By far this is the best case I have seen to label the actions of the President illegal. Perhaps the only beneficial byproduct of this nonsense would be a legal challenge to one of these wiretaps that could set us up for a modern version of the Youngstown case; one that would apply to the war on terrorism because, at least from a legal perspective, the roles of the various branches of government are ill-defined in face of this supposed constant threat and ever-ongoing state of war. Unfortunately I assuem that challenging one of these wiretaps would be nearly impossible as the person on whom the spying is being done would have absolutely no clue.
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I am incredibly distrubed by what we are learning everyday. How could we fail to learn a single lesson from the “red scares” of the 1940s and 50s?
Great analysis. Russ Feingold made a forceful and eloquent argument on the Newshour last night as well. One of my Senators, Barbara Boxer, has requested the opinions of some “presidential scholars” on whether Bush/NSA constitutes impeachable offenses. Perhaps you should volunteer your analysis? đŸ˜€
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Her letter is at: http://boxer.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=249975