Disclaimer: I am online managing editor at Framingham-based Computerworld and was one of the editors for this project.
One-third of Americans voting next week will use voting machines that have never before served in a general election. Legal challenges to paperless electronic voting technologies are proliferating across the country, and as computer scientists demonstrated earlier this year, hacking challenges to many of these machines can bear fruit even faster than demands for recounts.
Computerworld.com has just posted an in-depth report on voting technology, covering the systems, vendors, controversies and potential pitfalls in each of the 50 states for the 2006 elections.
It’s been a labor of love by several of our editors, taking many hours over several months. And I think it turned out to be a useful and comprehensive resource for anyone following voting technology for next week’s elections. I hope you’ll give it a look; and if you find it useful, that you’ll bookmark it as you follow national election coverage next week.
I have been wondering about all this controversy and concern about electronic voting, and I think this looks like a good overview of where this issue stands at the moment in states across the country.
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I’m wondering, Sharon, what your opinion is on this? Do you think electronic voting is a good thing? Would you mind doing a little editorializing? What is your assessment of this thing at the moment? Are we headed in a good direction? What is your biggest concern about paperless voting and the possibility of hacking, etc.? Not to put you on the spot, or anything đŸ™‚
There is no other way to assure the public about the integrity of the system. I feel very strongly about that. The only time I’ve ever had the chance to guest-write the main editorial for Computerworld’s print publication (when our editor in chief was on vacation and her back-up was also unavailable) that’s the subject I chose.
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In addition to issues such as software security, there are other problems associated with trying to create and maintain a secure computer network that’s set up in a temporary location and overseen by volunteers who only work with those systems a couple of times a year. I sometimes use this example. What if at next year’s July 4 celebration on the Esplanade, volunteer workers set up a network of ATM machines around the area. You could deposit your money in the ATMs, but wouldn’t get a receipt proving you’d done so. Would you feel comfortable putting your money in such machines? I wouldn’t. Do we value votes in our democracy as highly as we value our cash? We should.
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Setting up and maintaining a computer network secure enough to handle financial transactions is a complex undertaking requiring trained specialists. I’ve been a security reporter at Computerworld, and have some idea of what banks and brokerages need to go through in order to keep their networks reliable and secure. Even if you set aside controversies over the reliability, accuracy and security of the software that runs some of the newer electronic voting machines, there are other critical components that often get ignored: training, maintenance and oversight. To expect that a temporary network that in many cases is set up and run by volunteers will run perfectly, is being overly optimistic. There will be problems; voter-verified paper ballots from a touch-screen machine at least gives poll workers the option of quickly tallying votes on Election Night, and offer candidates and citizens the right to a dependable recount if returns are close or questionable.
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Personally, I’m happy that my precinct uses optical scanning of paper ballots. I understand the issue of making voting accessible to the disabled, but there has to be a way of doing so without making everyone’s votes less secure.
but thank you for the thoughtful reply. It sounds like a paper verified system is a must if we are to go in the direction of electronic voting.