In this diary, I will focus on the White House’s concerns. What I have not understood is how the White House could assert that Iran has helped the insurgency since the insurgency has been principally Sunni. If Iran is going to help anyone, it will be some faction of Iraqi Shi’a. Who?
Taxonomy of Iraqi Shi’a. There are many different Shi’a factions. Who are they? What do they represent? The four most important actors are the Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the Islamic Dawa Party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and the Sadrist Movement.
Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. A central belief of the “twelver” Shi’ism of Iran and Iraq is that the twelfth Imam has disappeared and will return at some point. That means that there cannot be a clear leader of their community until then. Somewhat as a substitute, they look to leading scholars. Leading scholars are chosen from among their peers (the “ulema”). The community of scholars is responsible for granting titles like ayatollah and grand ayatollah.
Ali Sistani is based in Najaf, a very important center for Shiite scholarship. While in exile, Khomeini went there to study as well. One of the questions that arose in Najaf was the relationship between the Muslim scholars, the ulema, and the state. Ayatollah Khomeini took the view, unusual in Najaf, that the ulema were responsible for guiding the state. Sistani, of a more quietist view, is of the view that the Muslim laity are responsible for guiding the state. Remember this controversy: it reappears.
The al-Dawa. The oldest Shiite political party in Iraq is the Daawa Party founded in 1957 by Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr (uncle of Muqtada al-Sadr). This party grew in the 1970s and 1980s. Quoting Juan Cole,
Shiites in Iraq were radicalized and brutalized by two major events: the Baath crackdown on Shiite political activity in the late 1970s and 1980s, and the crushing of the 1991 uprising and subsequent persecution of and even genocide against Shiites in the South.
As a result of the Baathist suppression, parts of the al-Dawa turned to assassination attempts against Saddam Hussein. Parts went into exile – some in London, some Iran. The chief spokesman for al-Dawa is Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the former Prime Minister of Iraq under the Transitional Government.
The SCIRI. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq split off from the al-Dawa in 1982. It consisted of Iraqis but was based in Iran. During the Iran-Iraq War, they formed the Badr Corps which fought on the Iranian side of the Iran-Iraq war. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Badr Corps has crossed the border back into Iraq.
The SCIRI differs from the al-Dawa on the question of who should control the state. The al-Dawa is of the view that the Muslim laity should; the SCIRI thinks the ulema should.
If any entity might represent Iranian interests in Iraq, one might think it is the SCIRI and the Badr Corp, its military arm. However, this concern does not make sense. The SCIRI is part of the government of Iraq. Its chief spokesman is Abdul Aziz al-Hakim who recently visited the White House. While the Badr Corps has clashed a few times with Occupation Forces, it has had a policy of cooperation with the central government.
The Sadr Group. The Sadr Group is lead by Muqtada al-Sadr. He is the son of Shi’a cleric assassinated by the Baathist regime. Muqtada al-Sadr did not go into exile but instead went underground until Saddam Hussein was deposed. The Sadr Group has clashed with Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani: they attempted to take over the mosques in Najaf. They have also been accused of having murdered the former SCIRI leader Ayatollah Baqr al-Hakim as well as the moderate Abdul Majid al-Khoei on his return from London. The Sadr Group has been critical of Iranian influence in Iraq although Muqtada al-Sadr has visited Teheran. The military wing of the Sadr Group is the Mahdi Army. Their strength was revealed recently in October with their attack on the city of Amara in southeastern Iraq. The U.S. has alternately clashed and held its fire with respect to the Mahdi Army. It does seem to be behind the worst Shiite abuses in the sectarian battles in Baghdad.
Conclusion. So where does this leave us? The Bush Administration wants us to worry about Iranian meddling in Iraq. How will this meddling happen? Senator Lieberman wants to hoodwink us into thinking it will be through Al Qaeda, but that is patently absurd. It is not through Ayatollah Sistani: quietists don’t meddle and cannot be the agents of meddling. It is not going to be through Muqtada al-Sadr: the Iranians could not possibly control him. That leaves the Dawa and the SCIRI. But these two organizations are key parts of the government of Iraq! In fact, the head of the SCIRI just visited Bush in the White House.
Conclusion: The concern with meddling is a phoney one manufactured by the Bush Administration. Weapons of Mass Destruction, anyone?
EXCLUSIVE: Iranian Weapons Arm Iraqi Militia
http://abcnews.go.co…
KBusch, if you wouldn’t mind some constructive criticism, I found you offered a lot of knowledge here; however, taking more time to flesh out your conclusions would make the piece more persuasive. FYI I’m not trying to prove I’m a better writer than you or anything – I just mention this because I’m interested in your thoughts on this topic, but I wasn’t able to find the complete story in this diary. For example, you call Iran helping Al Qaeda “patently absurd” – why? I don’t understand that at all. I also don’t understand your rationales re: the other 3 actors you mention; Iran might not control Sadr, but it could still assist him as long as he is fighting the US instead of them (politics makes strange bedfellows); and as for Dawa and SCIRI, from your descriptions as “key parts of the government of Iraq” they sound like the two most likely culprits for Iranian influence!
Yes, this diary is condensed, but there is a lot to say here. I would prefer that a better writer took it up. Since I’m planning a series of diaries on this, I thought I’d take up one point at a time. Apparently I chose too large a point!
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Al Qaeda’s goal is to re-establish the caliphate. That’s why Al Qaeda is against nationalist leaders (like Saddam Hussein), monarchs (like King Hussein), and a U.S. presence on Saudi Arabian soil. Their hostility to the U.S. is actually not their principal hostility or their end goal — we tend to take it personally, but they really are aiming for something that occurs after they’ve chased us from the Middle East.
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Twelver Shiites don’t believe that a caliphate can be established until the reappearance of the Twelfth Imam. In other words, they’d never get behind Al Qaeda’s caliphate-establishing plans ever. That explains why some Sunnis believe in massacring Shiites on religious grounds.
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In short, I’m saying imagining such an alliance is absurd because they are mortal enemies.
Put it like this: The main group pushing the Iran-influence story is the Bush Administration, the same group pushing a government run principally by the Dawa and SCIRI. All the reports about Iranians arming militias or fomenting discord in Iraq are extremely vague. Who’s being helped? Why? Essentially the Administration is providing a vague, contradictory, almost self-refuting story: We should continue to stay in Iraq to shore up the Iraqi government that consists of groups close to Iran so that Iran doesn’t get too much influence.
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It makes no sense.
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Do you know of another source pushing this story?
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As for Iran supporting al-Sadr, it doesn’t make sense to me, but I’d like to see much more solid information to confirm that.
I suppose that it is not beyond the realm of possibility that Iran might help al Qaeda, I believe it was either Juan Cole or Marc Lynch (http://abuaardvark.t…) who noted that al Qaeda is Sunni whereas Iran is Shiite, and, to the extent that al Qaeda is active in Iraq, it is targeting Shiites. That makes it a little difficult to believe that Iran would help al Qaeda, particularly when Iran has its own surrogates (generally, the Badr corps) that it can rely on.
which, we must all remember, are a tiny portion of the people fighting in Iraq, but the true Sunni salafist or wahhabi dogmatists think shi’ism in the holy land is more evil than America (in America), being a “nearer evil” and more profane to the holy land.
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Those people aren’t really the issue in Iraq though, as KBusch said in her (her?) last diary.
I am in no way capable of debating the finer points of Iraqi/Iranian ethnicity and religion. However, I do know that a majority of Iranians are Persian, whereas most non_kurdish Iraquis are Arabs. Though most of both groups may be Shia, I’m wondering if their cultural differences become as or more important than religious similarities. This seems to be a point left out of most of these type of discussions.
provocative. i agree with CMD’s comment in your other diary that your arguments thus far seem reasonable and persuasive.
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look forward to seeing more in the series, particularly on shiite vs. sunni without american troops.
The irony regarding US strategy–such as it is–in Iraq is that the US appears to be targeting the Iraqi Shiite faction that is least connected to Iran (al Sadr’s Mahdi Army) to the clear benefit of the Iraqi Shiite faction that is most connected to Iran (the SCIRI and their Badr Corps). That is pretty much in line with the US government’s clear courting of al-Hakim. That does not strike me as a particularly intelligent strategy, if the idea is to minimize Iranian influence in Iraqi politics.
Thanks KBusch, I wish I had time to comment more on these.
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And don’t worry about Hakim and SCIRI. It’s not like the Palestinians are indebted to Jordan, Lebanon or Tunisia and they spent plenty of time sheltering in and smuggling arms through those places. Most of the influential Iraqis who lived in exile were either in Iran or the West… it’s not like there’s any who have shown any special indebtedness to us either đŸ™‚
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From what I’ve read on the subject (read Prince of the Marshes by Rory Stewart if you want to get a feel for Iraqi shi’a politics), SCIRI are the pragmatists while the Sadrists are the new world order types. Both are present in any given area but they are basically manifestations of the tribal order. This tribe joined Sadr, that tribe joined SCIRI. The politics in any given place are still all local, and people will follow whichever national movement demonstrates strength and the will to use it.
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Here’s hoping that Sadr screws something up badly enough that it becomes politically possible for Sistani to disown him (which he’s probably wanted to do ever since Sadr pulled the Najaf shrine stunt). That would enable Hakim to create a new parliamentary bloc sidelining Sadr in favor of Kurds and moderate Sunnis. Until Sistani publicly chooses moderation over shi’a unity, Sadr will stay in the government with sway over a significant portion of the Min of Interior.