Leaving Iraq and Saudi Arabia

What countries border Iraq and what are they likely to do? The border countries are Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Kuwait, Jordan, Syrian, and Iran.

Right away, it should be clear that neither Jordan nor Kuwait is likely to cause much trouble at all.  Jordan is highly dependent on foreign aid, has a weak economy, and an ineffectual military. Kuwait, an odd country of 2 million inhabitants half of whom are guest workers, might be rich but it too is unlikely to be part of an invasion of Iraq.

There are a few important facts to remember about Syria. Syria is a creation of the French mandate after World War I. World War I saw the destruction of the Ottoman Empire which had included all of what is now Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, and Israel. (None of those countries existed then. Many were not even provinces.) The Entente Powers after World War I divided up the Middle East. British control included Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine; the French controlled Lebanon and Syria. The French wanted to make sure that there was a country in which Christians dominated. That is why they carved Lebanon out of their mandate and invented a separate country out of it. The British, in turn, invented the countries of Jordan (originally Trans-Jordan) and Iraq.

This history is relevant in that it explains Syria’s ongoing interest, involvement, and over-involvement in Lebanon. There was long a feeling in the Middle East that Lebanon should have been part of Syria. I point this out because Americans tend not to know this history and tend to think that Syria’s involvement in Lebanon only expresses a sort of innate aggressiveness.

Syria, like Egypt and Jordan, is not an Islamic Republic. It is also run by a Baath Party which is vaguely Arab nationalist and vaguely socialist. The ruling clique in Syria represents an unusual religious minority. Unlike Saudi Arabia or Iran, Syria tends not to view its interests exclusively through a religious lens. At this point, I do not see a clear national interest the Syrians would have in Iraq after a U.S. withdrawal. (Corrections anyone?)

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More complicated is the case of Saudi Arabia. We have been hearing a number of hints about Saudi Arabia’s interest in protecting the Sunni Arabs of Iraq. There was a curious newspaper incident wherein a Mr. Nawaf Obaid, an adviser to the Saudi government, wrote an Op Ed in the Washington Post (November 29, 2006) in which he talks of pressure on Sunni governments to protect Iraq’s Sunni population in the event of a U.S. withdrawal.  He wrote:

Because King Abdullah has been working to minimize sectarian tensions in Iraq and reconcile Sunni and Shiite communities, because he gave President Bush his word that he wouldn’t meddle in Iraq (and because it would be impossible to ensure that Saudi-funded militias wouldn’t attack U.S. troops), these requests have all been refused. They will, however, be heeded if American troops begin a phased withdrawal from Iraq. As the economic powerhouse of the Middle East, the birthplace of Islam and the de facto leader of the world’s Sunni community (which comprises 85 percent of all Muslims), Saudi Arabia has both the means and the religious responsibility to intervene.

He further spoke of fielding Sunni brigades or using oil price manipulation to protect the Iraq’s Sunni population from extermination.  Yet four days later the Saudi government strongly disavowed this article and received, for its efforts, the thanks of Iraq’s Shiite leaders. (See The Australian, Dec 3, 2006)

This is oddly consistent with how Arab governments have been rattling sabers for decades to appeal to domestic concerns. Though saber rattling is common, saber usage is less so. (A history of the lead-up to the Six Day War will give one a glimpse of competitive saber rattling between various nationalist Arab governments.) Saudi Arabia’s military does not seem particularly cut out for an invasion of Iraq. In terms of population, Saudi Arabia and Iraq are roughly the same size and Iran has more people than both countries put together. Saudi Arabia’s military has been used for two purposes: (1) protecting the royal family and (2) guarding the border with Yemen. On this, Saudi Arabia spends an enormous sum and receives a huge subsidy from the United States. It seems unlikely that the Saudis would march into Anbar province (western Iraq) and march on Baghdad.

In addition, there are a number of disincentives for a Saudi intervention in Iraq. First is the location of the Saudi oil fields. The oil fields are all located in the East, in that part of the country bordering the Persian Gulf and closest to Iran. The Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 saw a brief “Tanker War” where the Iranians attempted to obstruct Iraqi shipping. The Straits of Hormuz, through which all tankers must pass, is notoriously narrow and extremely vulnerable to Iranian attack.

The location of the oil fields is made doubly sensitive because of the location of the 15% of the Saudi population that is Shiite. The Saudi Shi’a are all concentrated in the eastern part of the country, near or atop the oil fields. Obviously, the Saudi government does not want to see that population radicalized.

My conclusion from this is that the Saudis will be very concerned with Iran becoming more powerful in the Middle East, and that they will do anything they can to get the U.S. military to restrain the Iranians, but they will be quite reluctant to undertake anything on their own in Iraq.