Congressman Holt has indicated that he is amenable to changing the language of this bill. As of the date of this letter, those proposed changes have not been made public. Unless these proposed changes address our concerns, our recommendations regarding this or any other proposed legislation to address election problems remain as stated herein. A recent Zogby poll shows that 92% of the American public wants the right to view vote counting and obtain information about it, making a very strong case for transparency and against secret vote counting outside the observation of the public. We believe that fiscally responsible and secure solutions will ensure transparency and
restore full validity to all future election results for millions of voters across America.
Whereas HAVA and many proposed legislative amendments are written to enable technology-based elections, our remedies are written to enable democratic elections. The question of if and how technology is integrated into elections must build off of this foundation, and not vice versa.
We wish to acknowledge your and Congressman Holts support for election integrity that led to the development and co-sponsorship of H.R. 550 to amend HAVA in early 2004. However, in the years since H.R. 550s first introduction, revelations about electronic voting and HAVA outcomes undermine the bills original purpose. We describe these in detail below.
In light of our work in the area of election integrity, we ask you to consider the strategy as described below. We have submitted our remedies and recommendations to some of the most experienced election officials in the nation, and have received their support. Our proposal reflects years of work to restore the democratic processes required to support the American Republic as
envisioned in the U.S. Constitution. Your leadership in enacting the remedies described below is an important first step towards this goal.
REMEDIES
1) PAPER BALLOTS Amend HAVA to require durable voter-marked, paper ballots, which are defined as those ballots used in the first count, as the
legally defensible gold standard for determining voter intent. The voter-marked paper ballot is auditable, durable, observable, efficient, and reliable. Federal law (the Voting Rights Act) requires voting records be kept for 22 months following every federal election. The use of electronic voting machines severely hinders our ability to comply with this mandatory retention of voting records. States that choose, in the administration of their elections, to follow
federal HAVA leadership, will then be able to quickly implement sane and sensible checks and balances into their voting systems.
a. This amendment should also encourage states, through appropriate
incentives, to implement checks and balances appropriate to democratic elections
such as parallel hand-count verifications on election night, and financially
feasible and accessible recounts.
b. Additionally, paper ballots for all voting systems are required in order
for states to comply with existing federal law regarding information technology
(IT) disaster recovery plans. Pursuant to the E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-347, 44 U.S.C. 3531 et seq., Title III, Federal Information Security
Management Act (FISMA), all states must have viable disaster recovery plans for
all IT-based systems. Paper ballots requirement shall include language to
enforce this existing law.
2) FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO ELECTIONS INFORMATION Amend HAVA to require
elections-related information at the local, state and federal levels be made
available to any person under the civil rights principles embodied in the
Freedom of Information Act in a way that addresses the special circumstances in
elections.
a. All information necessary to validate elections must be produced by the
voting system and its accompanying elections procedures;
b. When information to validate the election is requested, it must be
provided before recount and contest periods have expired;
c. The information must be provided in a usable and cost-effective manner;
d. Restrictions should not be imposed by proprietary claims, nor shall
removal of access to information be placed outside of governmental custody.
3) SUNSET THE ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION (EAC) The EAC was
established in the Help America Vote Act to help implement the Act through 2006.
There is no longer any meaningful purpose in continuing to fund and maintain the
EAC.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1) ACCOUNTABILITY STUDY We recommend a comprehensive GAO report to assess
HAVA, monies spent and disbursed, and subsequent end results. This report will
provide an analysis of vote tabulation systems including both hand-counted paper
ballot and electronic systems (such as DRE touch screen and optical scan). This
report will also include a study of the applicability of e-voting products for
the nations election systems, and the efficacy of the Election Assistance
Commission (EAC) Certification program.
2) CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE We recommend a congressional committee to
study the election crisis and hold public hearings. This special committee would
work closely with a 50-state representational task force including state and/or
local election officials, and an equal number of individuals and representatives
from interested citizen groups. This committee would issue a report recommending
state-based electoral reforms.
New information available since the original introduction of H.R. 550 includes
the following:
Discoveries by computer security experts that the nations e-voting
systems are vulnerable to unacceptably high rates of failure as well as
unacceptable exposure to the insertion of malicious programming.
Evidence that software can be configured to create an electronic
recording of a result that is different from that shown on the paper trail
generated from a printer attached to a DRE.
o The Election Science Institute (ESI) study of Cuyahoga County, Ohios
primary election showed 1.4% of Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT)
cartridges exhibited missing ballots; 16.9% of VVPAT tapes showed a discrepancy
of one to five votes between the tally of ballots and the electronically
recorded results; and 2.1% showed a discrepancy of over 25 votes.
o In the same ESI study, team members discovered that of 40 VVPAT tapes,
9.6% were either destroyed, blank, illegible, missing, taped together or
otherwise compromised.
o In Denver County, Colorado VVPATs contained gibberish instead of
legitimate voter choices, and that
printer jams rendered VVPAT unsuitable for use in recounts or audits.
o Doug Jones, Associate Professor of Computer Science, University of Iowa,
testified that paper trails are sufficiently unreadable that only a small
fraction of voters can actually view them.
o Additionally, the use of DREs routinely disenfranchises voters, through
DRE failure, or just because the limited availability of DREs per jurisdiction
is a cause of long voter lines and limited access to voting.
Evidence that the e-voting solutions implemented to address voter
disabilities do not do so. Providing an accessible voting system for persons
with disabilities was a major rationale for HAVA. Noel Runyan, an accessibility
engineer, testified in the Colorado lawsuit that none of the major voting
sy
stem vendors VVPAT systems met federal disability requirements, particularly
for voters with visual disabilities.
Preliminary recommendations by the National Institute of Science and
Technology (NIST) to universally decertify
paperless and paper trail technologies in the federal 2007 voting system
guidelines, citing the non-auditability and high risk factors for DRE touch
screens. Legislation supporting investment in a voting technology that is soon
to be obsolete, and is proven insecure, is fiscally irresponsible.
Statistical evidence that audits of only 2% of all precincts, as
recommended in HR 550, even if properly executed, fail to catch misdeeds or
mistabulations by voting machines. The H.R. 550 audit language further fails to
address even the most fundamental procedural issues. Election night parallel
hand-count verifications offer a better solution than relying exclusively on
post-election audits. Accessible and financially feasible recounts provide
security and integrity for a given voting system.
Questions concerning the composition and authority of the EAC. The EAC
consists of Presidential appointees and is vulnerable to partisan appointments
made by the Executive Branch. Legislation authorizing the EAC to delegate core
governmental electoral functions to private vendors eliminates the critical
decentralized checks and balances necessary for U.S. democracy.
The failure to address the publics right to know. The current status
quo within the e-voting industry, supported by EAC Certification procedures,
violates fundamental civil rights as defined in the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) by allowing industry stances of proprietary solutions and the use of
nondisclosure agreements, and fails to recognize the right of the citizenry to
access information to validate their own elections.
The EAC Certification Program has created a system in which every
jurisdiction, beginning in 2007, must replace or use uncertified voting
equipment. In 2007 jurisdictions adhering to federal guidelines must comply with
the EACs 2005 Voting System Guidelines, rendering all current and existing
voting equipment uncertifiable. The EAC Certification Program has three
fundamentally fatal flaws, which expose our elections to unacceptable
risk and present two unacceptable choices: 1) replace computer-based election
equipment every two years while implementing repeated testing for same at
exorbitant financial expense, or 2) use un-certifiable computer-based equipment.
The three flaws are as follows:
o The EAC Certification Program creates a situation wherein elections are
run using substandard and highly vulnerable equipment. The EAC approves
certification guidelines at least two years before products meeting the
guidelines are released to market. As a result, election officials end up using
sub-standard equipment. As well, the published certification guidelines,
detailing all of the existing vulnerabilities to be addressed by future
products, provide a virtual blueprint for tampering with election equipment in
current use.
o The business model on which the EAC Certification Program is based is
unrealistic. Software and hardware development requires significant upfront
financial investment. Once the product is delivered to market, preliminary
testing on a broad scale is needed to identify and fix bugs. However, the
election market environment makes this technological testing impossible. The
public market can neither afford to subsidize computer-based product
development, nor because there are fixed timeline requirements for elections
provide the necessary testing. The unacceptable result is that costs continue
to rise as our national elections are effectively used to test the product.
o The Certification Program creates a situation wherein it is virtually
impossible, without considerable expense, for election officials to use
certified equipment. The 2005 EAC Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (2005 VVSG)
require election software to be registered in the National Software Reference
Library (NSRL) with any ensuing modifications to the registered software to be
re-tested and re-certified. The typical scenario for elections more often than
not will call for modifications to the certified software because of ballot
design requirements and
patches for fixing bugs in the software. When these inevitable changes occur,
states have three choices: 1) run uncertified software that has not undergone
the required post-modification testing, or 2) incur unacceptable financial
expense for repeated testing, which itself may or may not even be feasible
depending on the nature and timing of the modifications, or 3) request a
grandfather waiver from the EAC Certification Progr
am, which, if granted, renders the entire certification process moot since such
a practice leads to the de facto nullification of the NSRL requirement.
Included with our letter to you is a copy of the recently published book Hacked!
High Tech Election Theft in America ~ 11 Experts Expose the Truth. Each chapter
in this book portrays the raw truth about our dangerously diminished right to
vote and have it correctly counted in the age of electronic voting. On pages
189 – 193, you will find our specific concerns regarding the February 2005
version of H.R. 550 presented in detail.
Given the new information we are presenting to you, we ask that you join us in
exploring real solutions for restoring integrity to our election process. We
have supplied you with evidence indicating that adding a “paper trail”, audits
and an empowered EAC to an insecure, non-transparent voting system does not
offer the necessary meaningful reform necessary to repair our broken election
systems. We are hopeful that you will engage in healthy debate and provide the
leadership to legislate changes to truly rebuild a democratic election system.
We wish to thank you for your help and support with this most serious matter.
Sincerely,
ENDNOTES
1GAO Report on Election Equipment (September 2005)
Black Box Report: Security Alert (July 2005)
Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuBasic Interpreter (February 2006)
www.ss.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/security_analysis_of_the_diebold_accubasi
c_interpreter.pdf
Security Assessment of the Diebold Optical Scan Voting Terminal (2006)
http://voter.engr.uc…
2http://bocc.cuyahoga…
3Conroy v. Dennis, Case No.: 06 CV 6072 filed in Colorado District Court
4http://vote.nist.gov…
5http://www.pfaw.org/…
http://www.nyvv.org/…
6Conroy v. Dennis, Case No.: 06 CV 6072 filed
in Colorado District Court
An End To Faith-Based Voting: Universal Precinct-based Handcount Sampling To
Check Computerized Vote Counts In Federal and Statewide Elections
