Blue Mass Group

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The well is dry – bar advocates go unpaid once again

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Consider, too that the “Special Counsel” on the big dig will be paid $700.00 an hour – and will never have to wait. 

All the outside, non-state-employee attorneys who are hired on an hourly basis also without becoming state employees to represent state employees, like say Matt Amorello, are paid $200-$700 an hour, and not subject to line item appropriations.

The attorneys for the indigent?  Every year, the well runs dry, and we stand “bowl in hand” like Oliver Twist, saying, “Please sir, may I have some more?”

Most of the time, the court-appointed attorney is the lowest paid person in the Court. 

That is, when we are being paid.

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  1. CPCS does grat work – legally NECESSARY work – and the Legislature has again and again underfunded it.  Personally, I always thoguht is was because too many legislators have a private practice on the side, and regard CPCS as competition – even if it’s work they don’t want to do themselves, another ‘struggling young lawyer’ might have a case taken away.  But CPCS works only for those who cannot afford other services.

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    I will call, as a constituent, my Rep. – who happens to be a lawyer with a small private practice.  It can’t hurt.

    • CPCS does grat work – legally NECESSARY work – and the Legislature has again and again underfunded it.  Personally, I always thoguht is was because too many legislators have a private practice on the side, and regard CPCS as competition – even if it’s work they don’t want to do themselves, another ‘struggling young lawyer’ might have a case taken away.

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      Policy by anecdote’s not a good idea but here goes.

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      Another lawyer I know does state advocacy work.  I offered her a position that would have quadrupled her pay and I was quite annoyed that she declined.

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      She declined because: she like her advocacy job; she liked the hours; she complained about the rate of pay and the bookkeeping, but not enough to opt to quit. She has a small kid and like to stay home a lot. Flexibility.

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      I think the state advocacy positions are filled with lots of people like the one I’ve described.

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      She chose to earn $50 per hour.  Why pay more? 

      • Either your practice is HUGE, or she is making absolute peanuts right now.  IS $50/ hour the “blended” rate, or is that what you bill for the hours that you bill, knowing in advance that you cannot bill all, or even most, hours?

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        Yeeks, how do they pay off their student loans?  Any law school graduate in the last 10-12 years has got to have near $100K on the Sallie Mae tab, maybe more for younger folks.

        • She was, and is, making peanuts, by choice.  There’s lots of part-time lawyers out there.

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          I don’t know anything about the billing rates.  I thought $50 sounded high. I recalled it was closer to $45.

        • Why do I say “they go unpaid”?  Well, they are not considered employees, and not allowed to unionize.

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          These aren’t the downtrodden, uneducated masses of blue-collar, held down by the Man workers.  These are college and higher educated folks.  And they’re seeking unionization?

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          Let me ask this: if the liberal bastion that is Massachusetts government is so damn benevolent, great and wonderful, ignoring profit and all that in favor of the plight of the working man and woman, why the heck do we need yet another public service union to raise the wage of someone who’s smart enough to choose to work for a prevailing wage yet stupid enough to remain because it’s too low. 

          • The $100k figure would be gross income, not net. Attorneys would have business costs. (Assuming for the sake of argument that public defense work is all the attorney does, and the attorney bills for 40 hours per week.) An attorney would likely pay at least one secretary or assistant, at a cost of at least $30-35k (not just salary but taxes and unemployment etc.). Office rent? Conservatively $750 to $1500 a month maybe depending on the town? Already the hypothetical attorney is down $39-$53k- and that doesn’t even include telephones, electric, WestLaw, or pens and paper, for that matter.

            • I think Central Mass costs are probably lower, but regardless, I don’t see the symptom of too low a wage. 

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              If the wage were too low, wouldn’t we see too few attorney taking the state advocacy cases?  As it is, they’re spending the line item and then some.

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              I don’t want to put words in your mouth, but are suggesting that $50 per hour is too low an hourly rate?

              • Just out of curiosity, do you think there is any public employee anywhere in the country, at any level, who isn’t paid too much?

                • Romney was paid the full salary…he just donated it.  Massachusetts paid out every penny to which he was entitled.

                • Perhaps I should rephrase the question.  I was talking about positions in government, not individuals.  I’ve seen you rail about high public salaries in town, state, and federal government, I was just wondering if there was any position that you believed deserved a raise.  I meant firefighters, governor, Congressperson, etc., not just this or that Republican.

                • I don’t rail against high public salaries, I rail against mechanisms that cause government salaries to become unreasonably high: Turnpike patronage, public sector unions, Quinn Bill, late night congressional raises.

                • It is absurd that judges– state or federal– don’t make as much as the first year lawyers that aren’t even allowed to appear before them.

                • I remember reading an article that said that Gov. Romney had renovated part of the State House basement to put in a staff of advance people and an hair salon for himself.  I thought “no way”, so my college student son and I made time to go to the State House and hunt for it – there it was, a hair salon complete with the full size hair dryer with hood and what looked like a dozen staffers, all to keep Gov. Romney looking good and do his advance work.  I wonder what they were paid and what THAT all cost.

                • Besides, the lawyers we’re discussing aren’t public service employees.  They’re independent folks who decide to pick up advocacy cases or not. 

            • But you do not bill for your clerical time, such as time spent billing.  Certain categories of work are billable, certain not.  You are required to keep good records and subject to random audits, which is appropriate.  You do not get reimbursed for your basic expenses – for example, malpractice insurance[a big expense, internet, legal research data bases – but then since I have a practice that is more than 50% private clients, some times it feels like the Commonwealth is being subsidized, you know?  But after DSS butted into the case that became Care and Protection of Vivian, I felt a call, a kind of higher vocation, to protect families and children against the state butting in where it was neither wanted nor needed, and all too often, did harm.

          • It doesn’t take a genious to know the difference between gross and net – and the maximum hours that can be billed the state [or you will not be paid for taking cases] is 1400 – that equals $70,000 not $100,000.

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            And the issue was NOT seeking a raise, it was seeing that those who had already done the work, got paid within 30 days of billing for it. 

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            One more thing, some attorneys CARE about the indigent AND 39% of the work is child welfare or mental health cases.

            • the $35k/yr most Assistant District Attorney’s make and it doesn’t seem so bad.  Bottom line – the system is broken, has been for years and the prospect of fixing it is slim. 

              • While I totally agree that Assistant District Attorneys make far to little – this is not the best comparision.

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                First of all – even for the attorney who wants to do as much court appointed work as possible – it is very difficult to bill the full 1400 allowed.  You can do a duty day and receive only very few appointmetns.  In addition, court appointed attorneys are limited in what they can bill for waiting time (i.e. you can sit in court all day waiting for your case to be called but only be able to bill for a certain amount of time – used to be only one hour – not sur if that has changed), they can not bill for much of travel time, etc.

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                Even more to the point, an ADA does not have to pay for office rent, malpractice insurance, office supplies, computer research service and/or library materials, copy and fax costs, etc. etc etc.  If you have an office assitance then the costs go way up.  I recall a number of years ago (maybe 15) figuring out that it cost almost $50 an hour to keep a two person firm open – it would be much higher now.

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                In addition, an ADA gets paid vacation and health insurance.  So while they do make peanuts, a court advocate likely doesn’t make more.

      • It is true that a large part of the reason the rates for appointed indigent defense attorneys is not higher is because attorneys keep doing the work for the peanuts that the state pays.

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        BUT that was NOT the issue of AmberPaw’s “The Well Is Dry” post.  She wasn’t asking for a raise for court-appoitned attorneys — though I know she wants one and I believe one is constitutionally mandated.

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        The issue of the post is that many of the court-appointed attorneys who agreed to provide indigent defense at the rates the commonwealth has agreed to pay and who have ALREADY DONE THAT WORK are not going to be paid in a timely fashion because the legislature did not appropriate enough funds to pay for the last quarter of FY07’s work.

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        The well is dry for attorney’s who have already done the work (some of it as long ago as April 1, 2007) and have now submitted their requests to be paid.

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        If the legislature recesses before approving the FY07 supplemental appropriations request submitted by the Governor which includes some $22.3 million for court-appointed attorneys, the attorneys WHO HAVE ALREADY DONE THE WORK will not get paid until the fall.

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        That is unfair whether you are someone who has turned down 3x$50 per hour or someone who feels there is some obligation to perform public service work at below market rates or even a lawyer that can’t get or doesn’t want another job.

      • My guess is she didn’t think you and she were a good fit, but she didn’t want to hurt your feelings.  By the way,  you were offering her $200/hour?  Wow.  I think that is more than the highest paid associates are making at the big firms. 

          • Based on absolutely no backgroud facts of my particular anecdote, OpenSociety appears to be conflating pay rate with billing rate. 

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            In fact, secretaries are billing close to $100 per hour currently in some of the large firms, and all starting associates in excess of $185.

            • I can tell you that a second year associate at a large NYC firm is billed in the $400/hour range.  Partners go for $800-1000/hour.

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    • The CPCS staff attorneys get paid salaries, and never miss a payday.

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      It is the grunts, the private attorneys, who are used to balance the budget on the backs of the poor and treated as expendable budget cannon fodder.

  2. Private counsel are permitted to only work 1400 hours per year which equals $70,000.  They must have an office, phone, computer, internet access, research capability, and all of the normal expenses of an office, including paper, envelopes, staples, pens, etc.  All of this is paid out of the $70,000 before the attorney gets to spend dime one.  Think about it.  How much do they actually clear in a year assuming they actually work the full 1400 hours.

    • I know a couple of folks who do it.  Both work out of their home with darn low overtime–no lexus, no rent, no library, no employees.  I have a pretty good idea of the billings, and, in my opinion, they make peanuts.

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      But, it’s their choice to do so, and each of them do it because it’s a time flexible job and doesn’t require any marketing or advertising.  My take on the advocacy work is that it’s a lot of part-time lawyers.  I may be mistaken.

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      I concede that if the work’s done, and you’re not paid, then the cripe is 100% legitimate.  I wonder, but don’t know, how many people are owed how much money for work performed.

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      But, also take look at the referenced line item. The allocation has gone from $76.5 million to $95.1 million to $166.8 million in 2005, 2006 and 2007.  How much justice (read dollars) must the state dispense?

      • I don’t know how many people are affected by the line item deficiency but the amount needed to pay the attorneys who have not been paid for work performed in FY07 is $22.3 million.

      • Every time a law is passed that makes penalties tougher, or adds a criminal penalty of a year or more in jail, that means that there are more cases, more indigent people who need lawyers, and the cost of indigent criminal defense goes up!

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        Did you know that 39% of the cost of court-appointed attorneys is caused by DSS cases, involuntary commitments, and other civil cases?  Since the passage of the Adoption and Safe Families Act, this state gets $3000-$6000 when a child is taken from a parent, and the parents rights are terminated – including dads who are treated like seconhd class citizens…not a penny if the kid goes home.  Funny thing – there has been exponential growth in court cases where DSS seeks  to tgerminate parental rights….

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        The attorneys do not drive the cost.  Legislation does as does social policy.

    • Can’t they have regular paying clients?  Or are they forbidden from representing anyone other than the indigent at $50/hour?

      • Yes, they theoretically can have regular clients.  That is, the state does not prohibit it.

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        There’s a big BUT though.

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        As I found when I did a lot of court-appointed work [which I stopped the last time the budget was seriously underfunded and they owed me close to $20k at the end of the fiscal year (2003)] it is nearly impossible to do a good job at indigent defense, be at court as much as one needs to to make a not-quite-decent living doing it and build a private practice at the same time.

      • 70% of my clients are private.  But I hurt so bad for the kids who are made into legal orphans by DSS and the courts, and the parents who are fighting to keep their kids whose only “crime” is being poor, or homeless, and turning to DSS for help only to lose their kids and have to fight in court to get them back – it is not all about accused criminals and I just cannot turn my back on those folk…do you really want me to turn my back?  Shouldn’t I get paid in a timely way, even at a low rate?

        • Especially for work you have already done and billed.  It is absurd for those funds to be bound up in the bueauracracy.

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          This topic has thwo threads in it: one, relating to late/nonpayment, and one about the billing rate.  We were just addressing the latter.

          • …whether the state court system can require (Amber prefers the term “conscript,” to which I concur) members of the state bar to represent indigents at rates set by the state.  She said yes.

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            It isn’t a voluntary system.  It can be, but it really isn’t.  I’ll give you an example.  Anyone during the Vietnam War era could have volunteered for the military.  But that didn’t cause the US gov’t to eschew conscription.

  3. …the legislature should, of course, appropriate enough to pay the state’s bills.

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    A comment above at gary @ Fri Jul 27, 2007 at 13:29:13 PM EDT prompted a question to which I don’t know the answer.

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    Besides, the lawyers we’re discussing aren’t public service employees.  They’re independent folks who decide to pick up advocacy cases or not.

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    I don’t know how it is in Massachusetts, but in more than a few states, judges can require members of the state bar to represent indigents, particularly in criminal cases, and possibly also in civil cases against the state, and maybe even in matters (such as divorce) that are regulated by the state.  Such appointments are, of course, not voluntary, but they are paid for at a fixed, generally low, hourly rate set by the respective state.  Does Massachusetts have a similar regime by which judges can require members of the bar to represent indigents at the rate set by the state?

    • See “Cooper v. Regional Justices” SJC 09464.  Note that earlier, in the LaVallee case, footnote 18 specifically validated such conscription. What do you think?  Deb

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      THE CASE VERBATIM AND IN FULL:

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      Click here to find out more!

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      FindLaw> State Resources> Massachusetts> Primary Materials> Massachusetts Court Opinions
      ROSEMARY J. COOPER vs. REGIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT COURT FOR REGION V & another.[FN1]
      DOCKET  SJC 09464.
      Dates:  September 6, 2006. – October 10, 2006.
      Present  Marshall, C.J., Greaney, Ireland, Cowin, & Cordy, JJ.
      County  Suffolk.
      KEYWORDS  Supreme Judicial Court, Appeal from order of single justice. Attorney at Law, Compensation.

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      CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on September 10, 2004.

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      The case was heard by Spina, J.

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      Ronald F. Kehoe, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants.

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      John M. Thompson (Linda J. Thompson with him) for the plaintiff.

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      GREANEY, J.

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      This case involves cross appeals from a memorandum and judgment of a single justice of this court allowing the petition of Rosemary J. Cooper seeking relief pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3. The petitioner is an attorney and a former bar advocate. The appeals pertain to her assignments to represent indigent criminal defendants during the unusual temporary shortage of defense counsel that was first considered in Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 442 Mass. 228 (2004) (Lavallee ). We conclude that relief under G.L. c. 211, § 3, was inappropriate.

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      The background of the case is as follows. On July 28, 2004, we decided the Lavallee case, which addressed the lack of legal representation for indigent criminal defendants through the assigned counsel system administered by the Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS). [FN2] Id. at 229-230. The problem arose because of a shortage of lawyers in the Hampden County bar advocates program resulting from the low rate of attorney compensation then authorized by the CPCS budget appropriation. Id. We concluded that the petitioners, indigent criminal defendants without assigned counsel seeking relief pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3, were being deprived of their right to counsel under art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Id. at 230, 232.

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      In Lavallee we noted that a “systemic problem of constitutional dimension” had developed, and we examined possible remedies to ameliorate the situation. Id. at 244, 246-249. We rejected, among other proposals, the petitioners’ request to “order judges to authorize compensation rates in excess of what the Legislature has appropriated.” Id. at 241. However, we established deadlines for the appointment of counsel and remedies if those deadlines were not satisfied. Id. at 246. More particularly, we concluded:

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      “[N]o defendant entitled to court-appointed counsel may be required to wait more than forty-five days for counsel to file an appearance…. Proceedings in which a defendant cannot participate meaningfully may not be allowed to proceed. If, despite good faith efforts by CPCS, no attorney has filed an appearance on behalf of an indigent defendant within forty-five days of arraignment, the criminal case against such defendant must be dismissed without prejudice…. Similarly, an indigent defendant who is held in lieu of bail or under an order of preventive detention may not be held for more than seven days without counsel.” (Citation and footnote omitted.)

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      Id.

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      We then outlined a preliminary system to implement our remedy, subject to modifications by the single justice after consultation with those affected by the system. Id. at 247. We directed as follows:

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      “The clerk-magistrate of each District Court in Hampden County, and the clerk-magistrate of the Hampden Superior Court shall, on a weekly basis, prepare a list of all unrepresented criminal defendants facing charges in their respective courts and shall forward that list to the Superior Court RAJ [Regional Administrative Justice], the District Court RAJ, the district attorney, the Attorney General, and chief counsel for CPCS…. On receipt of that list each week, the Superior Court RAJ shall schedule a prompt status hearing with respect to each defendant who has been held for more than seven days, or each defendant whose case has been pending for more than forty-five days.”

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      Id. at 247-248. We went on to explain:

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      “If the Superior Court RAJ determines [as of the time of the status hearing] that, despite good faith efforts of CPCS and any efforts by others to secure representation for any such defendant, there is still no counsel willing and available to represent a defendant, then the Superior Court RAJ must order the following: (1) with respect to any defendant who has been held in lieu of bail or pursuant to an order of preventive detention for more than seven days, the Superior Court RAJ shall order that the defendant be released on personal recognizance and may, in view of the emergency nature of this remedy, treat this as an exception to Commonwealth v. Dodge, 428 Mass. 860, 864-866 (1999), and impose probationary conditions pursuant to G.L. c. 276, § 87, without the defendant’s consent; (2) with respect to any defendant who has been facing a felony charge for more than forty-five days without counsel, or a misdemeanor or municipal ordinance violation charge for more than forty-five days without counsel on which a judge has not declared, pursuant to G.L. c. 211D, § 2A, an intention to impose no sentence of incarceration, the Superior Court RAJ shall order that the charge or charges be dismissed without prejudice until such time as counsel is made available to provide representation to that defendant.”

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      Id. at 248-249.

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      In a footnote, we identified two methods for expanding the pool of available attorneys, one through CPCS and one through the courts. The first method was to be implemented by CPCS outside the Hampden County bar advocate program:

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      “We expect that CPCS, pursuant to its authority under G.L. c. 211D, § 6 (b ), will take all reasonable measures to expand the list of attorneys available to accept assignments in criminal cases in Hampden County, who are not members of Hampden County Bar Advocates, Inc. [HCBA].”

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      Id. at 248 n. 18.

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      The second method was to be implemented by court officials under the supervision of the single justice:

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      “[T]he Superior Court RAJ, with the assistance of the Regional Administrative Justice of the District Court for region 5, may pursue all reasonable means to develop his own list of qualified and available attorneys from which he may make assignments, consistent with S.J.C. Rule 1:07, as amended, 431 Mass. 1301 (2000),[ [FN3]] whenever CPCS certifies that is has no available attorney. Such attorneys shall be entitled to compensation from CPCS appropriated funds at the rates approved by the Legislature.”

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      Id.

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      Following the Lavallee decision, the single justice entered a two-page “interim order” on August 17, 2004, authorizing judges in the arraignment sessions of the Superior and Districts Courts of Hampden County to assign counsel in cases where CPCS and HCBA were unable to provide counsel who would accept assignments. The assignments were to be made in two ways. First, assignments could be made from lists, created in cooperation with the RAJ of the Superior Court for the western region, of lawyers who were willing to accept assignments and who were determined to be competent to handle cases assigned to them. Such assignments expressly were not to be made under the existing contract between CPCS and HCBA, and payment to such assigned counsel would be “at the hourly rates approved by the Legislature.” Further, the lists were to be “managed pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 1:07.” Under the second method, judges could assign cases pursuant to Mass. R. Prof. C. 6.2, 426 Mass. 1415 (1998), [FN4] to lawyers who executed contracts with HCBA. Those attorneys could be assigned “day duty” pending an inquiry into the status of the contract between CPCS and HCBA, and the contracts between the individual attorneys and HCBA. The single justice stated that he would “be available on short notice to review assignment orders that attorneys wish to challenge.”

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      The interim order was anticipated in a letter from the RAJ of the District Court Department for Region V (Region V RAJ), to the president of HCBA. In the letter, the Region V RAJ informed HCBA that he soon would be assigning dates and cases, as needed, in the five district courts of Hampden County. The cases would be assigned to attorneys on the August, 2004, list of Hampden County bar advocates. The use of the list was “not premised on whether the attorney is presently in the program but that qualifications have been met with CPCS.” The Region V RAJ stated that the assignments would be made pursuant to Mass. R. Prof. C. 6.2.

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      The petitioner here is an attorney and practices in Hampden County. She had served as a bar advocate since 1989, pursuant to annual contracts executed with HCBA through 2003. Although the petitioner had not signed a bar advocate contract for 2004, her name appeared on the August, 2004, HCBA list of bar advocates because she had been accepting assignments in 2004 prior to the interim order. Commencing with an order dated August 13, 2004, the petitioner received approximately nine “orders of assignment” from the Region V RAJ, directing her to appear at Springfield District Court for “day duty” on various days and at which time she was “to accept cases in need of assignment.” The orders of assignment stated that her appointment was not made in her capacity as a bar advocate, but rather in accordance with CPCS’s approval of her qualifications. The orders specified that she would bill her fees at the legislatively authorized rate of thirty-seven dollars and fifty cents an hour, [FN5] and provided that “[a]ny assertions of good cause under [r]ule 6.2 will be made by affidavit” to the Region V RAJ by facsimile transmission.

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      To each order of assignment, the petitioner filed an “Objection to Order of Assignment and Motion to be Paid $60 Per Hour” (objection). [FN6] In the objection, the petitioner stated her “primary objection” is that Mass. R. Prof. C. 6.2 “is being improperly used as a hammer to threaten, coerce and intimidate her and other attorneys who have been certified … by [CPCS] to accept appointments without her consent and that she is being subjected to unequal treatment because other qualified attorneys not so certified are not also ordered to appear and accept appointments.” She asserted that “this conscription of her services by [o]rder of the [c]ourt represents involuntary servitude and a violation of the Thirteenth and Fourteen[th] Amendments and [art. 12] of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights [and] is a taking of her property….” Last, the petitioner stated that, while she did not object on the basis of any “good cause” exception to rule 6.2, “the [thirty-seven dollars and fifty cents an hour] rate of compensation … is inadequate to cover her expenses and provide a modest income for her services.” She requested that the court order payment to her of sixty dollars an hour in recognition that “exceptional circumstances … necessitate the use of a different procedure” under S.J.C. Rule 3:10(5), as appearing in 416 Mass. 1306 (1993). [FN7] In support of this filing, the petitioner also filed an affidavit and a memorandum of law. The petitioner’s objections were denied by the Region V RAJ.

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      The petitioner next sought review by filing a petition under G.L. c. 211, § 3, in the county court. Her petition seeks various declarations and orders, particularly a declaration that orders of assignment cannot be used to assign counsel to indigent defendants, and a declaration that trial court judges have authority to order increased compensation to attorneys under S.J.C. Rule 3:10(5). The single justice denied relief on the ground that the petitioner had signed a 2004 bar advocate contract containing a provision imposing the legislatively authorized rate of compensation, thus barring her from claiming entitlement to compensation at a rate higher than thirty-seven dollars and fifty cents an hour. The petitioner moved for reconsideration, pointing out to the single justice that she had not signed a 2004 bar advocate contract. Acknowledging an oversight, the single justice allowed the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and vacated his previous order denying relief. The single justice went on to conclude that: (1) the petitioner’s appointment pursuant to rule 6.2 was warranted because exceptional circumstances had necessitated appointments under a different procedure “outside the framework of G.L. c. 211D,” and (2) the petitioner was not limited to the legislatively authorized hourly rate because she had not served voluntarily, and is “entitled to a hearing in the trial court to determine the fair rate of compensation to which she is entitled.” The single justice allowed the petition and remanded the case for a hearing on fair compensation. The parties filed cross appeals.

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      1. We first take up the petitioner’s claims that are inherently contradictory– she challenges the orders of appointment, but she is willing to provide services pursuant to those orders if she can be compensated at an hourly rate higher than the legislatively authorized rate.

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      The petitioner argues that the orders of appointment “were not warranted by ‘exceptional circumstances’ within the meaning of S.J.C. Rule 3:10(5); that the unavailability of volunteer private attorneys in Hampden County willing to work at statutory rates does not constitute the type of ‘exceptional circumstance’ referred to in rule 3:10(5); that the [RAJ’s] alternative system is not consistent with G.L. c. 211D and the implementing rules of this [c]ourt; and that it conflicts with Lavallee.” The petitioner failed to raise these issues in her objection and supporting memorandum of law. The issues are deemed waived. Trustees of the Stigmatine Fathers, Inc. v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 369 Mass. 562, 565 (1976). In addition, the petitioner’s equal protection claim is waived because it was not adequately raised below. See Rattigan v. Wile, 445 Mass. 850, 863 (2006); Sugarman v. Board of Registration in Med., 422 Mass. 338, 347 (1996). Her entire equal protection claim consists of a conclusory statement that the orders violated her constitutional rights under certain State and Federal constitutional provisions. See Rattigan v. Wile, supra; Sugarman v. Board of Registration in Med., supra.

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      The petitioner’s challenges to the orders of assignment on the above-noted grounds or other grounds (such as the fact that the court had no authority, inherent or otherwise, to make involuntary appointments of counsel, or that the rate of compensation was inadequate and imposed an unjust financial sacrifice), fail because the petitioner could have relied on these grounds to satisfy the “good cause” exception to rule 6.2, thus obviating the need for seeking relief pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3. Rule 6.2 states, as a general matter, that “[a] lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person,” but expressly provides exceptions for “good cause,” and sets forth three nonexclusive examples of good cause, including that an assignment may impose an unreasonable financial burden on a lawyer or otherwise violate the law. See note 4, supra. Based on her stated objection and supporting affidavit and memorandum of law, the petitioner could have moved to be excused from the orders of assignment on the grounds that she did not have a current bar advocate contract with HCBA and was not willing to serve, and the rate of compensation would cause her undue financial burden. Had an order entered excepting her from service based on, for example, undue financial burden, the petitioner would have had no reason to challenge the adequacy of the rate of compensation or, for that matter, to raise the quixotic claim of “involuntary servitude.” She purposefully chose not to object to the orders of assignment “on the basis of any ‘good cause’ exception to [r]ule 6.2.” We reject the petitioner’s contention that no alternative remedy existed under rule 6.2 because that rule authorizes relief only from appointment and not “relief from conscription.” Based on the petitioner’s grounds for her objection, an order could have entered granting her relief from the assignments.

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      The demonstration of the absence of adequate alternative remedies is a threshold requirement that a petitioner must satisfy before we will proceed to address the merits of a petition under G.L. c. 211, § 3. General Laws c. 211, § 3, is specific on the point by conferring on this court the power of “general superintendence of all courts of inferior jurisdiction to correct and prevent errors and abuses therein if no other remedy is expressly provided ” (emphasis added). See Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 406 Mass. 701, 706 (1990). See also McGuinness v. Commonwealth, 420 Mass. 495, 497 (1995); Commonwealth v. Yelle, 390 Mass. 678, 687 (1984), and cases cited. The petitioner’s failure to demonstrate sufficiently the absence of adequate alternative remedies, when such remedies were available, are fatal to her claim for relief under G.L. c. 211, § 3. See Hunt v. McKendry, 434 Mass. 1025, 1026 (2001), and cases cited.

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      2. The single justice’s memorandum and judgment after reconsideration must be vacated, including his directive that the matter be remanded for a hearing on fair compensation. As a consequence, we need not address the respondents’ claim in their cross appeal that the single justice’s action of remanding the matter to determine fair compensation violates the separation of powers doctrine and the remedial limitation imposed by the Lavallee decision. Lavallee, supra at 248 n. 18. We also need not address the petitioner’s claim (and the single justice’s suggestion) that the lack of fair compensation for lawyers in the petitioner’s circumstances may amount to a constitutional taking.

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      3. The memorandum and judgment after reconsideration entered January 14, 2005, in the county court is vacated. A new judgment shall enter in the county court allowing the petitioner’s motion to reconsider and vacating the judgment of January 3, 2005, for the reasons set forth by the single justice in his memorandum and judgment after reconsideration; and denying the petitioner’s petition under G.L. c. 211, § 3.

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      So ordered.

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      Footnotes

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      FN1. The Springfield Division of the District Court Department.

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      FN2. In 1983, the Legislature enacted G.L. c. 211D, which replaced the Massachusetts Defenders Committee with the Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS) to provide indigent representation in criminal and certain noncriminal matters. See St.1983, c. 673. See also Rosenfeld, The Right to Counsel and Provision of Counsel for Indigents in Massachusetts: The Hennessey Era, 74 Mass. L.Rev. 148, 149-151 (1989) (providing historical background to assigned counsel system for indigent defendants). As explained in Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 442 Mass. 228, 232 (2004) (Lavallee ), “Hampden County Bar Advocates, Inc. [HCBA], contracts with CPCS to provide counsel for indigent defendants in Hampden County in cases that CPCS staff attorneys are unable to accept. See G.L. c. 211D, § 6 (b ).”

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      FN3. Supreme Judicial Court Rule 1:07, as amended, 431 Mass. 1301 (2000), pertains to the process of making fee-generating appointments, requiring, among other requirements, “each court to create lists of qualified candidates and then generally make appointments from those lists in rotation or sequential order.”

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      FN4. Rule 6.2 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, 426 Mass. 1415 (1998), provides:

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      “A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person except for good cause, such as:

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      “(a) representing the client is likely to result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; or

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      “(b) representing the client is likely to result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer; or

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      “(c) the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer’s ability to represent the client.”

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      FN5. The legislatively authorized rate for District Court cases is currently fifty dollars an hour. G.L. c. 211D, § 11, as amended by St.2005, c. 54, § 2.

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      FN6. The rate of sixty dollars an hour was the rate that the petitioner asserted CPCS had established in 2005 pursuant to G.L. c. 211D, § 11, which authorizes CPCS to establish rates of compensation to appointed or assigned counsel “subject to appropriation.”

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      FN7. S.J.C. Rule 3:10(5), as appearing in 416 Mass. 1306 (1993), concerns the assignment of counsel to persons found to be indigent. The rule provides, in pertinent part: “If … the judge finds that a party is [indigent or indigent but able to contribute], the judge shall assign the [CPCS] to provide representation for the party, unless exceptional circumstances, supported by written findings, necessitate use of a different procedure that is consistent with G.L. c. 211D and the rules of this court.”

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