A – The state of play
B – Candidate by candidate analysis
C – Summary
A – State of Play
There’s a lot of divergence among the polls, but the general spread seems to put Clinton and Obama near each other with 26-29% of the vote, and Edwards around 22-24% in Iowa. Let’s call this the Big Three.
The Iowa caucus is divided into discrete groups called precincts, with some 4-9 delegates available at each. Note that a candidate cannot win part of a delegate…winning 1.9995 means that you’ve won 1. Every Iowa precinct will have more than 4 delegates available, which means that any candidate with 20% support will get something out of that particular precinct.
Every analysis predicts that Hillary and Edwards can anticipate strong support across the state, buttressed by their organizations with strong local networks. Whether Obama’s network can compete is still a question. As I said earlier, however, the concentrated nature of Obama’s support in urban areas means that his support will likely be undercounted. In 2004, CNN’s “entrance poll” pegged Dean’s support at 20%., but he received 18% of the delegates. Edwards’ statewide appeal (plus some last-second maneuvering — see below) boosted him from 27% support amongst caucusgoers to finishing with 31% of all delegates. Obama is in the same situation as Dean…much of Obama’s support will not count due to the fact that this process rewards broad, thin support over concentrated deep support.
While we have polls about which Democratic candidates are most popularly a second choice, they do little good. An MSNBC poll that improbably puts Edward in the lead in Iowa also has it that 41% of caucusgoers have Edwards as second choice, Clinton is the second choice of 31% asked, and Obama is at 27%. However, with Clinton and Edwards viable statewide, don’t expect their supporters to need to go to their second choice. In any case the campaigns are organized enough to have local precinct captains who will keep their groups together to avoid helping a competitor.
With their cohesion and relevance assured, the second choice of those backing Edward or Clinton doesn’t matter much. Which makes the poll quoted above kinda useless.
B – Candidate by Candidate analysis
Of course, the Big Three campaigns will have orders to corral as many supporters as possible, even if it doesn’t raise their delegate count. More precisely, they will have orders to keep their supporters away from any other candidate who may benefit. Further, if a leading candidate does not reach 15%, the campaign will have orders about which weaker cousin to support — the standing order from Dean central was for non-viable Dean groups to go to their nemesis Gephardt, knowing that he was not going to finish well. Less-organized or persuasive campaigns may not have such orders, or be able to carry them out. (By the way, for a metric of what an organized campaign is, it’s one of the three whose candidates who have made it onto the Rhode Island primary ballot.) Furthermore, prepared campaigns will be ready to work this system, and will have designated people to seduce the non-viable supporters with tailored arguments. This only helps Hillary and Edwards at this stage.
Obama: Obama will be viable in much of the state, and he does apparently have a decently organized campaign. However, we can expect that in much of the state, particularly rural areas, Obama will not be viable or even well-organized.
I can’t imagine Hillary being much of a second choice for Obama-ites. I can see many going toward Edwards due to the similarity of their message, though that represents a strategic risk. Short of Edwards, I’d expect to see many Obama-ites resolutely let their voice count for naught rather than support another candidate, or move toward Kucinich.
Richardson: This is the big kahuna. With about 8% of Iowa behind him, Richardson will have a lot of support across the state, and much of it will not be viable. His supporters will have a strong role in this process. Where would a Richardson caucuser go?
Well, most of Richardson’s supporters are attracted by deep resume and experience. That leaves out Obama right off. Given Richardson’s occasional defense of Hillary during the debates, and the fact that she is the most experienced of the Big Three, I foresee Hillary getting a grudging boost from non-viable Richardson folks. Edwards has a shot at those who like Richardson as a leading voice against the war, as does Kucinich. But Hillary is the big winner here. Just because Richardson’s supporters don’t have her as a first choice doesn’t mean that they hate her. Conspiracy theorists can chime in here, but a strong assist from Richardson in Iowa locks him in as her VP.
Biden: Has a long Washington attachment, and deep experience similar to Richardson. However, Biden supporters I’ve seen are also attracted by his occasional populism and liberalism on personal freedoms. I can see Edwards taking up much of Biden’s support insofar as anyone wins.
Kucinich: In 2004 Edwards reaped rewards from a deal he cut with Kucinich to receive Kucinich’s non-viable supporters. Amazingly, his supporters went to Edwards nearly en masse despite the massive dissimilarities in their platforms. Already, people are speculating if it could happen again. Whether Kucinich’s steady 2% will be ordered somewhere again is unknown, but 2004 showed they will likely go along with it.
Dodd and Gravel: Both poll around 1%, which doesn’t add up to much. I don’t have much of a read on Dodd’s campaign, and I expect Gravel’s people not to join up with any other candidate.
C – Summary
Because of the ridiculous nature of the caucuses, there is a disconnect between the popularity of a candidate, and their level of success in Iowa. Organization is key, as is attracting supporters of second-tier candidates. As the candidate among the Big Three most focused on experience, Hillary Clinton can expect to benefit from Richardson’s and Biden’s supporters who similarly value that aspect. Edwards, helped by the smartest and most local ground game in Iowa, may also peel off a great deal.
The caucus is going to be a great challenge for Obama. Unless extensive training was been offered to his local supporters, they may be played on caucus night the way that Dean and Gephardt were. There seems little natural support for him from second-tier supporters, so expect some sleepless nights for his strategists.
(By the way, if this process seems confusing, you probably aren’t interested in Instant Run-off Voting.)
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What I don’t say here, I say here.
Thanks for the post, I really enjoyed it. I have a couple questions.
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p>1)
I’ve heard that he’s less well organized in the rural areas, but not to the point of being non-viable. Do you have a sense of which areas in Iowa he’s not viable?
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p>2) I don’t know that Obama’s lack of experience means that Richardson’s supporters will go directly to Clinton. I understand why that would flow logically, but I don’t think it’s true unless Richardson and Clinton make a deal a la Edwards and Kucinich in 2004. They could easily flow to Edwards for the reasons you suggest. And I don’t think it’s simply the resume that attracts people to Richardson. If for example, the war is your biggest issue, then after Richardson, one might be attracted to Obama, who was against it from the start, rather than to Edwards who had to apologize for his vote or Clinton who seems not to want to bend on that issue. Do you think enough of Richardson’s support will go Clinton’s way to put her over the top?
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p>One more thing, on Dodd. Anecdotally, I’ve heard that Dodd supporters are more likely to go with Obama than anybody else, but I haven’t heard anything to confirm that.
1 – Viability pretty much depends on the organic support a candidate has in state; organization is important in how it reacts to the situation inside the caucus room. If Obama and Edwards had even support in Iowa, I’d expect Edwards to have better results because his people know how to work the system better. Insofar as a regional disparity for Obama, my understanding is that he’s weaker in the western, rural part of the state, colored red in this map (NB: That does not necessarily mean conservative. Iowa Democrats are pretty progressive considering the swinginess of the state).
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p>2 – About Richardson, he’s been my top choice all along, albeit not by much. I’ve done Richardson events in New Hampshire and Massachusetts, as well as conference calls, and his resume is always the big seller among supporters. True, second place is often his stance on the war. But that stance is more about future actions, namely pulling out as quickly as possible. From the point of view of “where do we go from here?”, Obama is on the same page as Clinton and Edwards in advocating a slower withdrawal.
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p>As you say, there’s always the possibility of overt deals (as Kucinich and Edwards had) as well as covert moves (Dean’s campaign directing stragglers toward Gephardt) that could confuse this. As for Dodd, his online trendiness simply isn’t showing up anywhere…where his people may go I don’t know. While Obama is similar on civil liberties, his strongest card may be the IAAF, and Edwards likely more attractive to union activists.
This process, as you describe it, seems to temper broad popularity with grassroots organization, citizen-to-citizen persuasion, influence for supporters of less popular candidates, and collaboration among candidates.
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p>”Because of the ridiculous nature of the caucuses, there is a disconnect between the popularity of a candidate, and their level of success in Iowa.”
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p>That disconnect seems to have the potential to dislodge shallow impressions and media narratives and replace them with all the messy goodness of human social interaction.
is between the actual support a candidate has, and the results of the caucus. If 25% of caucusgoers support you, you can come out with between 22% and 28% of the delegates due the system’s workings.
The “system’s workings,” to me, sound like a democratic process that reflects how consensus-building works, where political organization meets social tradition. Often “the actual support a candidate has” is a polling model that sees society as a collection of individual consumers of information. I mean, if it was actually corrupt, or just totally arbitrary, that would be bad. And there’s no reason the Iowa results should have the influence they have. But what you’ve described sounds like a fairly rational brokering process.
Much of your analysis discusses possible deals the campaigns might cut with each other.
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p>This implies some discipline within the camps and caucus whips, things like that, sufficient to override the caucusers’ personal feelings. (What if you hate Hillary, but your coordinator says to to vote for her?)
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p>I can believe this could be the case, but is it really?
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p>It also implies that the different campaigns have mutually beneficial deals they could make with each other.
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p>I can see this with the larger campaigns, but what does Kucinich (to use your example) get out of a deal with Edwards? He hasn’t got enough viable support to benefit from a reciprocal deal, is all I mean.
For example, if the Richardson crew at a caucus decides to join up with Clinton supporters, it might be in exchange for one of their members being elected a delegate to the county convention.
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p>I can tell you from experience that some strange bedfellows can be made in a caucus. Minnesota caucus goers often organize by interest rather than candidate. I saw a delegate list from 1992 that included delegates elected on the pro-choice/pro-life slate. I kid you not.
Like so much else, it depends on who a campaign has got there. For example, most of your Dean caucusers had come to detest Gephardt for his constant attacks on Dean. That night, the precinct captains who could explain with enough clarity (and volume) that it would help him down the road to support Gephardt now moved their people successfully. Those who didn’t explain that Gephardt actually had crashed and headed for a defeat that night, were unable to move their people.
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p>With the explosion in participation in the caucuses, most candidate groups in a given precinct will have enough people to allow for specialization beyond a precinct captain. A well-organized caucus will have:
-A precinct captain to speak the candidate’s praises and dole out favors (who gets to represent the candidate as delegate/s at the official convention in Des Moines);
-A number cruncher to figure out how many more people are needed to win another delegate/ how many can be lost;
-A persuader to raid other candidates’ supporters;
-A herder to keep others’ persuaders from making any headway.
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p>As for what Kucinich got out of it in 2004, I don’t really know. When asked that question in a debate between Iowa and New Hampshire, he only replied that “he wanted delegates and figured Edwards would have some”. A weak answer, but that’s what he offered. At this point — and I am completely spitballin’ here — Kucinich is headed for a bruising primary for his own seat in Congress. Maybe he wants some fame and muscle to make appearances down the road?
I guess you don’t like caucuses, maybe (why not tell us how you feel?).
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p>But consider the alternative: winner-take-all primaries (even if the winning all is by congressional district). In a divided field this easily leads to victories by a small plurality.
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p>Consider the strategic voting calculations that go on: Oh, I really like Ghandi, but the polls show I’d just be throwing my vote away. Dare I chance a vote for Kennedy, or must I hold my nose and vote for Nixon so that Hitler won’t get it?
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p>We’re used to all that, but it’s all the more labyrinthine, byzentine, all-them-other-adjectiventine if we accept it without thought or criticism.
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p>Now a primary with preferential voting–IRV to you–might have some claim to the moral high ground, but absent that, why are primaries so great? Just because you are used to them?
My goal was simply to look at the strategic implications of the Iowa caucuses, and accept the rules for what they are. But since you asked, here is a short list of the ways that the Democratic version of the Iowa caucuses fall short of minimal democratic standards:
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p>
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p>These four reasons are probably central to the fact that the Iowa caucus, despite its hyped and pivotal role, will attract no more than 5% of eligible voters.
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p>If Pakistan’s election were to require physical presence at an exact moment to case a public vote, many of which would not be counted, it would be denounced by the world. The town meeting in Middleboro for the casino was a train wreck, and that was a model of flexibility compared to this event.
So the caucus is only to decide how many delegates are pledged to a candidate at the national party conventions, right?
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p>How many delegates does each state send, and how many states are winer take all, and how “pledged” are the delegates once they get to the convention? Are some state’s delegates more pledged than other’s?
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p>Is there a rule that once the state party decides on their delegates to send on primary or election day, they cannot change who they send on convention day? The whole two party system is a big 800 lb gorilla here, and then the electoral college… If we were going to replace the primaries with a new system like IRV or some other way to make our votes count for as much as they can, should we get rid of primaries and parties and the electoral college completely?
These delegates go to a convention in Des Moines, where voters will apportion the delegates to the National Conventions in Denver and Minneapolis. As for how the national conventions work, I’m not entirely sure to be honest.
I would agree with sabutai that Iowa while it seems closer to IRV with the 15% threshold and second choice options is really stupid, no same day registration, it lasts several hours, fixed times, etc. as others have mentioned all make this a barely democratic process.
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p>It would be much better if we had IRV in an open primary.
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p>There should be either regional primaries or a national one and they should all be IRV, they should be open, and same day registration should be allowed. Also those that would be 18 by the general should be allowed to vote regardless of age.
Sounds like the process Deval Patrick mastered to win the state convention, which propelled him to a primary win and the corner office.
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p>I would be happy to ditch the primary, which is buried among lots of bigger states on February 5 (could we pick a WORSE date) in favor of a caucus on the heels of New Hamster.
So any process that ended with Deval Patrick as governor is inherently a good process? Either you work for the casino industry, or you’re committing logical fallacies.
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p>If you’re going to argue for implementing entirely unrepresentative and undemocratic procedures, you need a better argument than that.
I-O-W-A !!!!!
Registered voters: Republican, 574,571;
Democratic, 600,572;
undeclared, 737,054
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p>TOTAL I-O-W-A voters: 1,912,197
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p>And of that total number of corn-fed registered voters,
ONLY approx. 7%… repeat 7%…
will attend a caucus.
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p>It is absurd that Tim Russett, Chris Matthews, George Stephanopoulos, etal. have been boviating over I-O-W-A for months on end and giving the outcome of anything that happens there such inflated importance.
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p>Why do campaigns cost so much? The cost of broadcast advertising tops the list. By starting these campaigns earlier and earlier, the media makes out by turning the cash spiggot on sooner for networks. The pundits are the snake oil salesmen…by pontificating incessantly about the polls and the horserace and the petty gotcha politics sooner and sooner, they help their organizations kick up the advertising revenues sooner, as well.
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p>So here we are…7% of I-O-W-A’s registered voters will winnow our national choices down to an incredible few…not because there are no other state elections to follow, but because the punditocracy will parse the bejeebers out of the outcome numbers and make them mean more than they deserve…
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p>I-O-W-A…G-O…A-W-A-Y…and take Tim, Chris and george with you.
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p>
My previous post on “what the Iowa caucuses would look like in Massachusetts” is here: http://vps28478.inmotionhosting.com/~bluema24/showD…
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p>First of all, the precinct caucuses are a long way from electing a president. They will elect 13,485 delegates to county conventions is a couple of months, and those delegates will repeat the process of gathering at the county level, breaking into groups and then selecting delegates to the state convention who will actually select the national convention delegates.
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p>Secondly, the delegates elected at the precinct caucuses are completely unpledged. This means that they are free to change their mind before they caucus at the county convention. Furthermore, some of them will no longer have a candidate by the time the county conventions come along (such as the 12% who were elected as Gephardt supporters in 2004), and will have to choose from the remaining candidates at that point.
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p>The convoluted nature of the caucuses actually increases the representation of voters as compared to a primary. In Massachusetts, I cast my vote for one candidate, and if he or she doesn’t reach 15% in my congressional district or statewide, my vote doesn’t count at all. In Iowa, if I go to a caucus where my candidate doesn’t have 15% support, I can attempt to join with other apparent “losers” to form a 15% faction that will elect a delegate that might vote for my candidate, or I can join my second-choice group and influence the outcomes that way.
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p>These caucuses are incredibly fluid, which drives outsiders crazy. The question that has been asked about the Kucinich/Edwards deal in 2004 is a good one, because it highlights these tensions. One reason for making a deal is that you might gain delegates directly. If the Edwards group went from 2 to 3 delegates when the Kucinich supporters joined, the third delegate might well get allocated to a Kucinich supporter, especially if the would-be delegate agrees to go with Edwards as a second choice at the county convention. Another reason for a deal is to prevent an opponent from gaining the delegates. If the Kucinich supporters don’t make up a viable group, then the delegates would be allocated to another group, which might have ended up giving Dean or Kerry another delegate.
on the candidates’ positions on the issues that are most important:
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p>Click Link