Good gravy. It's been Robert Kagan on the radio all day. I traced back from Robert Siegel's breathless interview with him on ATC this afternoon to actually read Kagan's column on Georgia.
Does Robert Siegel really find this tripe to be impressive?
The details of who did what to precipitate Russia's war against Georgia are not very important. Do you recall the precise details of the Sudeten Crisis that led to Nazi Germany's invasion of Czechoslovakia? Of course not, because that morally ambiguous dispute is rightly remembered as a minor part of a much bigger drama.
The events of the past week will be remembered that way, too …
Historians will come to view Aug. 8, 2008, as a turning point no less significant than Nov. 9, 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell. …
Damn! That's really significant!!
I'm on the record as really detesting argument by analogy … but I suppose that's a historian's stock in trade. (Eh, Bob?) But when someone like Kagan pulls out the old Magic 8-ball and starts telling us “such-and-such will be remembered like thus-and-so” … we'd do well to have our BS detectors at the ready. Talk like that has a hell of a lot less to do with analysis of what's in front of him, and everything to do with self-aggrandizement. It's a puffing up of the present moment — hey kids, who doesn't want to be a part of history? — topped off with the self-congratulatory implication that I recognized it, and I told you so then.
What if he's wrong? If 8/8/08 isn't our Berlin Wall, or Munich, or whatever; if it doesn't turn out to be so damn important … well, who's gonna notice? It's not exactly a testable hypothesis right about now, is it? The question of the omniscence of Bob Kagan just won't be very interesting if he's wrong. Kagan wins, either way.
So hey, when we're in the @#$% of a grinding, oh-so-historic land war with Russia — tell 'em Bob Kagan sent you. 'Cause, you know, it was historic.
Reminder: I am either a first or second generation Russian-American. I have been to Georgia [granted it was in 1966]. Yes,I do speak, read, and write Russian fairly well. More likely than not, I am part Georgian. So the myths, sorrows, and long history of the area is well known to me, at least.
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p>First, what typically happens when a country’s ally is attacked?
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p>Second, does anyone on this list know much about South Ossetia? Or Beslan, and the horrible deaths of hundreds of children at School No.1?
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p>To come up to speed, quickly I recommend the book “Beslan: The Tragedy of School No.1” by Timothy Phillips. Printed and bound in Great Britain by William Clowes, Ltd, Beccles, Suffolk. The author, himself, is a native of Belfast and no stranger to terrorism, and the effects of hatred with a long memory.
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p>A quote from the book:
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p>HERE is a video taken by the terrorists, themselves, during the seige: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories… See also: http://www.washingtonpost.com/…
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p>Beslan is in Ossetia, folks. The hostage children were almost all Ossetians. Imagine if terrorists had taken 1300 women and school children hostage in the USA, and held them till they had to drink one another’s urine to survive. That happened in Beslan, in North Ossetia – to Ossetians. Ossetians after this horrible event requested and received Russian passports and citizenship, and Ossetia broke away from Georgia.
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p>As to how many Chechens and Ingush were sneaking back and forth to do terrible crimes and terrorist strikes in Russia, Georgia, and Ossetia – and behaving much like the Waziristan area of Pakistan – suffice it to say that the Russian and Georgian press has been full of atrocities now for several years that rarely make much of a riplle here. Georgia decided to reclaim Ossetia. Russia said over our dead body. Now, how serious is the USA about being an ally of Georgia? And how much does the terrible crime against humanity in Beslan figure in?
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p>It would be ironic, and horrible, if World War III began in Ossetia because the Osseitians consider themselves Russian subjects [and North Ossetia and South Ossetia really ought to be one country] and Georgia considers Ossetia Georgian – and the terrible ethnic deportations by Stalin led to vast inequities and hatreds that most here in the USA today probably know nothing about.
Don’t forget that the decision to support the independence of Kosovo (by the Clinton/Albright State Department, I think)also plays into the thinking of Russian leadership about the future of South Ossetia and the area around Sukhumi on the Black Sea. Of course, when it comes to Chechnya and their desire for independence the Russians would prefer not to be reminded about Kosovo. Ironically, the Russians are hurting themselves badly with the Moslem communities of the near and far Caucusus. I recommend that you visit Kavkazcenter.com to see what I mean. The site is the home of the Chechnen rebels and can be read in Russian, English, Ukrainian and Turkish–though they vary the content for each linguistic audience.
If you have lived in the Caucusus you would know how much the 40 plus nationalities there all despise the Russians.
I’d love if someone could tell me what’s going on here, and don’t be afraid to insult my intelligence. I thought I did pretty well following the news, but I didn’t know there was any tension here. I know Georgia broke from the USSR in the early 1990s like the others, but not much else. Was Ossetia always part of Georgia? What is the source of the conflict? I just can’t believe we go from not hearing about tensions to all out war just a couple of days ago. I definitely feel like I missed something.
…a link to a paper.
certainly coming from anyone here at BMG. At this site the vast majority of diaries and posts concern domestic issues at either the federal level or the state level, which many here are quite knowledgeable of (certainly more so than I am). It therefore shouldn’t come as any surprise when not everybody is as up to date on international issues. Especially one demanding a relatively large depth of knowledge like the Georgian-Russo conflict.
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p>In addition, newspapers (especially most US papers, including the NY Times) really don’t do a great job at framing the larger context of issues, so your advice to just read a paper isn’t that helpful at all. It also implies that Christopher doesn‘t read the paper, which I’m willing to bet all the money in my pockets isn’t true. Again, not a helpful comment at all.
Maybe Kagan is a bit overblown, but the immediate geopolitical implications of Russia’s military move into Georgia are grave. There are domestic political implications, too:
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p>Why aren’t the anti-war activist out in front of the Russian consulate and UN mission in NYC? Code Pink? Where are all the progressives? I didn’t see them outside the Russian embassy in DC.
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p>What’s your agenda?
You sure developed an agenda pretty fast.
Frankly, I don’t see an easy solution.
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p>Drilling for oil is just one long-term response to the potential instability of despotic oil regimes like Russia’s. If we imported less oil, even marginally, that would make us less vulnerable to energy extortion by Russia, Nigeria, Venezuela, and all of the Middle East. I see that as a good thing.
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Then we agree. History, not the omniscent Bob Kagan, will judge. That was my point.
I infer you don’t see the invasion of Georgia as anything but an ethnic border squabble. Which is wrong.
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p>Kagan is right. This is an important event. You spend your energy killing the messenger but ignoring the immediate importance of what just happened, or, if you disagree, you fail to refute. Blame it on self-aggrandizement. That’s intellectually lazy.
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p>”Hey! We landed on the moon! But it’s too early to tell if it’s all that significant.”
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p>A western democracy is being invaded by Russia. But we can’t tell if it’s important or not.
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p>Again, what’s your agenda?
Kagan has a history of bunk in his columns.
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p>Glenn Greenwald has the Kagan Quotes of Super-Stupidity. These a just a few:
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p>In February 2004 he wrote:
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p>In June 2003, Kagan:
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p>So Kagan now wants the U.S. to risk war with Russia, on Russia’s border?
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p>Not worth it.
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p>There’s probably a way to use to diplomacy to get Russia to quit bombing the Georgians, without the U.S. bombing Russians. So let’s do it that way.
And all this time I thought it had to do about communism!
As always, the situation is not easy to untangle. I’m willing to bet that Russia has a radically different perspective on the invasion than we do in the West, and that understanding the Russian point of view (that’s understanding, not defending), is a key to figuring out an appropriate response.
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p>The first factor is history and geography. For hundreds of years, the Caucasus has been on the frontiers of the Russian empire-sometimes in, sometimes out. It has always been an area of ethnic, religious, and nationalist turmoil. Take a look at a good map. Throughout modern Russian history, it has also been a place of much violence-it borders Armenia, with the horrible massacre of the early 20th century, Chechnya, with its awful civil war of the last several decades, and is rife with independence and secession movements, from Dagestan, to South Ossetia, to Nagorno-Karabakh. Whether I agree or not, Russia internally has its reasons to act harshly in the region, to prevent (a) the loss of what it sees as its territory to other countries, and (b) to dampen the enthusiasm of secessionist movements in the region.
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p>The second factor is oil. The Caucasus isn’t so important for oil in the ground, but for transportation of oil to Europe and the West. Russia’s power on the world stage is enhanced (to put it mildly) by its importance as an oil supplier to the world. The government is clear wanting to control the production and supply, and has used all the power of the state to arrest, seize, and harass those who get in the way of Russian control. The BP dust-up is the most recent example, where the British chief of BP’s joint venture has had to leave Russia. The entire Yukos affair is another example. Oil is a tool of government policy and strength, and it’s not surprising that Russia would act to control the distribution system passing through the Caucasus.
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p>The third factor is dignity. Russia has watched its former republics slip away in the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR. The Baltic States are now part of NATO and the EU, while the “color revolutions” in Georgia,the Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan were demoralizing to Russia’s sense of itself as a world power. Russia also saw the loss of its power over former allies as a blow to its sense of world importance. Russia was extremely unhappy with the independence of Kosovo in February 2008, seeing it as the start of a “separatist storm” across its former territories It has been quite clear about its view that NATO expansion to Georgia and the Ukraine would be a “direct threat” to Russian national security (Deutche Welle). Russia has made its views on all of these issues known quite widely, yet feels that its concerns have been ignored by the West in general, and by the United States in particular.
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p>Finally, there’s old-fashioned power politics. The U.S. has encouraged Georgia in particular to cast its lot with the West, rather than Russia. Remember that Georgia is one of the few countries where George Bush is popular (the road into Tblisi from the airport is named after him). In 2005, President Bush visited Georgia, giving a speech praising the government and backing the Georgian government’s plans to deal with South Ossetia and Abkhazia (BBC Report). The US has very publicly backed Georgia in all its disputes with Russia. The Russians know we are fully occupied in Iraq and Afghanistan, and don’t have much capacity or cooperation from our European allies to back up any threats we might make against Russian actions. Frankly, Russia holds the cards right now-the US doesn’t.
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p>Bottom line? I don’t think this action is akin to the invasion of then Czechoslovakia. However, it is a real warning shot across the bow of Europe and the US to take Russia as a great power or face significant consequences. Even more so, it’s a warning shot to the Ukraine and other former republics and allies not to cozy up too closely to Western interests. I’m quite sure lots of countries are getting a clear message that, when the chips are down, the West will not come to help. Implicit here is that Russia would be a better protector and ally. Finally, this action is intended as a body blow to secessionist and independence movements. Russia sees a lot of risk, and will act with overwhelming force to deal with trouble on its frontiers.
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p>For Russia, there’s very little downside and a huge upside to its actions in Georgia. It’s good domestic politics, a strong assertion of power in its historical sphere of influence, and a major stick in the eye to the West, especially to the United States.
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p>What the rest of the world ought to do about this is an interesting question.
Not much riding to the rescue even during the bad old days of communism.
Those who know history are condemned to misinterpret it.
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p>Mark
Georgia is a country with numerous ethnic and religious minorities. In fact, the entire broader region is one of the most diverse in the world, and the other post-Soviet republics in the Transcaucausus (Armenia and Azerbaijan) had their own minority populations.
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p>As Georgia moved toward independence in the late era of the Soviet Union, some of these minorities in Georgia such as Ossetian and Abkhazians challenged Georgian authority. The clash between Georgian nationalism and such demands sparked conflicts,and warfare in South Ossetia and in Abkhazia. There were also numerous reports and accusations or outside intervention during violence in the early 1990s.
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p>There was also violence within the Russian Federation in North Ossetia between Ingush and Ossetians.
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p>As for current blame:
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p>Russia obviously deserved blame for its aggression.
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p>The leadership of the Republic of Georgia has at best acted highly imprudently, wittout conisdering the possible Russian response to their actions. In this respect Georgia’s policies are quite different from those followed by Czechoslovakia in 1938 and comparisons to an era of appeasement to not make any sense. This is especailly true because Georgia has seen Russian power as a major reason for the spearation of Abkhazia–the breakaway region on the Black Sea coast very near the future site of the Winter Olympics in Sochi. Why see Russia as a sinister miltary presence and then campaign to reestablish sovereignty in breakaway regions, at least for now in South Ossetia, and then express surprise at the military response of a power already seen as hegemonic.
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p>The Bush administration deserves a considerable share of blame as well for seeking to build up Georgia power as a thank-you gift for help elsewhere (Iraq) all the while knowing that an improved Georgian military would still never under any circumstances be able to fight off an even partially revived Russian military. The talk of extending NATO to Georgia also encouraged Georgia to believe it might recieve aid that would never be forthcoming. McCain is not personally responsible for this policy because he is not President, but he has shared in general in puffing up Georgian aspiration to engage in actions that were likely to result in disaster.
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p>Now it is time for the terrible reality check:
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p>Russia is willing to engage in military action within certain areas of the former Soviet Union.
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p>Small former Soviet Republics cannot stand up to Russia militarily and will never be able to do so.
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p>The United States can do nothing to protect such small Republics on the very edges of Russia–speechifying may appeal to a domestic talk-show or blog audience but will do nothing to change the reality on the ground.
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p>The only possible route to a solution will come through negotition, but all the violence and killing has likely set back any possible long-term solution.