The purposes of the U.S. nuclear arsenal are: (1) assuring our allies that the U.S. can and will defend them with nuclear weapons if needed; (2) dissuading potential adversaries from threatening the United States or its allies; (3) deterring an attack on the United States or its allies; and (4) defeating an enemy. Goal number (4) requires that the nuclear weapons actually work. Goals (1)to (3), on the other hand, require that our friends and enemies believe that the weapons work.
The United States has not tested a nuclear weapon since 1992. So how do we or others know that our arsenal works? The Department of Energy operates a stockpile stewardship program that seeks to provide assurance, without actual testing, that the weapons are functional.
But for goals (1) to (3) to work, it’s not enough that we are confident in our arsenal. Everyone else has to believe in it, too. And why should they belive it? I mean, suppose the stockpile stewardship program showed that our weapons were not reliable. Would we publish that news?
It seems to me that the only way to have good nuclear deterrence, assurance, etc., is to prove in an unmistakably clear way that the arsenal is sound.
Now, maybe a worldwide comprehensive nuclear test ban would be workable if we think the nuclear threat comes exclusively from states like Iran, which does not yet have a nuclear weapon and would undoubtedly have to test one before engaging in nuclear blackmail. So if Iran signed up to the treaty and kept its word, then there’s no reason we shouldn’t sign up, too. But of course, Iran is not the only nuclear state out there. North Korea already has the bomb and has already tested it. Pakistan, too. And even if we think about Russia, it seems to me that lack of confidence on both sides about the effectiveness of the other side’s nuclear deterrent is inherently destabilizing. And then, of course, there are non-state actors who would love to acquire a nuclear weapon.
So I find myself reluctantly concluding that I support periodic underground nuclear tests to ensure that our nuclear deterrent remains credible, at least until a future time when we can verify the destruction of all nuclear weapons everywhere in the world.
What do you think?
TedF
P.S. I suspect you could use game theory reasoning to show that it’s important for stability for each nuclear player to have perfect information about the other side’s capabilities. Does anyone have a view on this?
