Indeed, the people who deal with probationers every day – judges and probation officers – have spoken strongly against moving Probation out of the judicial branch.
Irrelevant. Of course judges don’t want probation moved to the executive branch – it means less power for them. That is not a good argument, and it has nothing to do with solving the problems that everyone realizes need to be fixed. Same goes for the probation officers, all of whom by definition got their jobs under the current system.
The judiciary is fully capable of addressing the leadership issues identified in the Ware report….
Unsupported assertion. Sadly, the judiciary seems to have proven precisely the opposite of Ireland’s claim. And Ireland’s evidence – that there is a new commissioner, and that a panel is recommending reforms – simply does not demonstrate that the judiciary is up to the task of managing probation over the long term. History suggests that it’s not.
[C]alls to move the department out of the judicial branch … while well-intentioned, will not serve the public’s needs.
Placing Probation in the executive branch would make probation secondary to institutional corrections, which focuses on parole and prisoner re-entry…. Placing Probation within the executive branch is likely to siphon probation resources into corrections and parole initiatives, at great cost to taxpayers, and to the detriment of probationers.
Unsupported assertion. Ireland is saying what he thinks would happen, but he supplies no basis for it. Sure, it’s possible that probation would be secondary if moved to the executive branch. But it’s also possible that probation would be made a priority; in fact, that seems likely, since the transfer would be a major Patrick administration initiative that they would very much want to succeed.
And probation officers’ priorities would be subject to political and other extra-judicial pressures, as has happened in other states.
Unsupported assertion. Additional penalty for unintentional hilarity. Ireland of course cannot know what would happen in the event that probation is transferred to the executive branch, and his vague assertion to what “has happened in other states” is not good enough. Furthermore, one of the most appalling findings of the Ware Report was the extensive indications of meddling in probation hiring from the legislature while the judiciary was supposedly in charge, which would certainly qualify as “political and other extra-judicial pressures.” Awkward.
[C]alls … to institute a civil service system for Probation, while well-intentioned, will not serve the public’s needs….
Instituting a civil service system at the Probation Department is also problematic. Under the civil service structure, it is extraordinarily difficult to hire the best people or dismiss or demote under-performing individuals.
Unsupported assertion. Additional penalty for unintentional hilarity. Here, Ireland trashes the entire civil service system while supplying no backup at all for his extremely broad claim. In addition, of course, his concern that it’s hard to “hire the best people” or “demote under-performing individuals” under civil service rings especially hollow in light of what has been going on in probation for the last several years, under the supervision of the judiciary.
For 130 years, the Probation Department has been housed within the judicial branch. The close working partnership between judges and probation officers has kept the public safe while providing cost-effective administration of criminal justice.
Unsupported assertion. The Ware Report strongly suggests that, at the very least, the current system has not done a great job with “cost-effective administration of justice.”
There may well be good reasons to keep probation within the judiciary, and it’s certainly a debate worth having. Unfortunately, Chief Justice Ireland didn’t supply any today.
Governor Patrick has just proposed merging probation and parole in a single “Department of Re-entry and Community Supervision.”
am I alone there?
…when the Chief Justice comments about something directly affecting his own branch. The Chief Justice of the United States gives a State of the Courts address/memo annually, which lately has routinely included scolding the Senate for not acting on nominees.
He also argues somewhat unconvincingly for keeping probation pretty much the way it is. Widmer says, in effect, that the potential for patronage is a lesser evil than what he describes as a flawed civil service system that gives a little too much preference to certain categories of job applicant. I would tend to think that patronage, especially at the level we have seen in probation, is still a greater evil, even if civil service rules need to be reviewed.
Civil Service should be the norm for determining the pool of vetted job applicants for all state jobs where a skill set is required. Once there is a professionally designed civil service exam, which should include the MMPI because personality types are relevant in a job like probation, the top three applicants, by scores and ranked criteria should be sent to the Chief Presiding Judge at each court house. The Chief Judge for Administration and Management should not be part of hiring in local court houses; he won’t be working with probation officers and is far more subject to political winds.
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p>Certain job experience could appropriately be worth extra points, such as each year in law enforcement, each year as an educator, each year as a treating clinician – but no credit for years spent as state house interns or staffers, please!
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p>Having each Chief Presiding Judge hire from such a three person, vetted pool makes sense because of the close working relationships in today’s understaffed court houses, the pressure from diversion programs, and the high volume in probation work. Personal chemistry, once the skill set, intellect, and experience are vetted is relevant.
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p>Having a father, mother, grandfather, aunt, etc. who is or was a judge or a probation officer must not be a determining criteria if the “best and brightest”, education, and merit are to matter in state hiring.
I would just add that it would be important for the “extra points”, and even the basis of MMPI-type disqualification, to be transparent, so as to keep everything fair and avoid hidden nepotism and other shenanigans.
What is relevant to me is that the pool of applicants come via civil service, and that the exam be given yearly so that each year’s graduates can compete for these positions while their knowledge base, optimism, and skills are fresh. It is also important that each Chief Presiding Judge make their own hires from the civil service pool only. Whether the agency itself “belongs to” the judiciary or to the executive is much less important.
the office politics of the situation, but the badly argued op-ed may be fulfilling some sort of political function.
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p>I remember a few years ago when Hampden County DA came out to defend the state police run forensic services. The forensics service at the time was a laughing stock. There were all sort of delays and lapses in protocol. There wasn’t a police department in the state that didn’t know how bad it was. The Globe was hammering the department. But former DA Bill Bennett came out and praised them for their good work.
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p>Don’t know if this is the case with Ireland or Widmer for that matter, but sometimes politics demands people defend the indefensible.
The Ware Report draws precisely the opposite conclusion of Justice Ireland about judicial leadership of the Probation Department in its analysis of judicial management and leadership of the Probation Department over the last twenty years.
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p>Indeed, the Ware Report demonstrates that successive chief justices of the Administration of the Trial Court have either been willfully complicit (e.g., the late Judge Irwin) or wholly ineffective (e.g.. Judges Mulligan and Dortch-Okara)in combating and rooting out patronage and corruption in the hiring and promotion process in the Probation Department.
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p>The judiciary is susceptible to the nefarious budgetary influence of the Legislature in hiring and promotion decisions at the Probation Department because the Legislature sets the budget of the entire judiciary. Moreover, the Legislature has exerted its punitive financial power and authority over individual courts, when individual judges would not to accede to influential legislators’ hiring suggestions or requests (e.g., the 1980s conflict between Boston Housing Court and Judge E. George Daher and Senate President William Bulger.)
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p>Successive Chief Justices of the Trial Court have either been successfully intimidated by the budgetary power exerted by the Legislature over the judiciary (e.g. Judge Mulligan) or eager participants in using the Probation Department as the Legislature’s patronage dumping ground (e.g., the late Judge Irwin.) Judge Ireland has offered no plausible explanation why this above judicial management behavior will not continue in the future, if the current judicial oversight and management of the Probation Department remains in force.
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p>Absent of additional, suggested civil service reforms, the transfer the Probation Department into an Executive Office of Re-entry and Supervision doesn’t inoculate against excessive patronage and outright corruption. However, such a reorganization of the Probation Department would mean its operation will be managed under the auspices of a branch of government that is politically accountable to the citizens of Massachusetts. Leaving the Probation Department under the authority of politically vulnerable judges who enjoy unelected lifetime tenure and who are not constitutionally subject to popular recall would permit patronage and corruption to continue unabated in the Probation Department.
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p>Justice Ireland’s attempt to preserve the management authority of judicial branch over the Probation Department should be rejected by the Legislature as a self-interested effort by the judiciary to preserve its undeserved, and ineffective management prerogatives over this crucial and problematic part of the criminal justice system.