One point I just want to hit on again:
The truth is, Obama got a solid plurality in Iowa — a primarily white state. He only lost by two percent in New Hampshire — another primarily white state. (And he got the same number of delegates there as Clinton). And in Nevada, where he didn’t do as well, he won across the state and even edged out more delegates. And now, [winning by 28%], he’s pummeled the Clinton campaign. For the bulk of this campaign she was considered the “inevitable candidate.” So brushing this major win off as “the black vote,” is insulting to the plethora of white supporters in the other states — not to mention the huge numbers of white voters in South Carolina who pushed Obama to a stellar victory.
Winning by 9% over Clinton in Iowa and 28% over Clinton in South Carolina compared to her 2% in New Hampshire (her supposed “big” victory) is a major, major big deal.
But it’s not just that he won. Look at some of these exit polls in South Carolina:
Obama’s Share by Age group:
18-24: 65%
25-29: 70%
30-39: 62%
40-49: 61%
50-64: 51%
65+: 32% (Hillary got 40%, the only age group she won).
Winning by shuch a margin in all but one age group means to me that he is not just the “youth candidate.” So, that’s why we aren’t hearing as much about the youth vote as perhaps we should. Yet, people still point to the breakdown of race and say that he may be the “black candidate.” This is just not so, and we can see it in the votes by race and age:
Vote by Race and Age
Non-Black 18-29: Obama 52% Clinton 27% (Edwards 21%)
Non-Black 30-44: Obama 41% Clinton 34%
Non-Black 45-59: Obama 40% Clinton 37%
Non-Black 60+: Obama 42% Clinton 42%
Among those who were not black Obama edge out Clinton in every single age group except 60+, and even there he tied.
EDIT: D’oh! I got completely mixed up, as Alex points out. Vote by Race and Age
Non-Black 18-29: Obama 52% Clinton 27% (Edwards 21%)
Non-Black 30-44: Edwards 41% Clinton 34% (Obama 25%)
Non-Black 45-59: Edwards 40% Clinton 37% (Obama 23%)
Non-Black 60+: Edwards 42% Clinton 42% (Obama 15%)
So, not as well as I had thought. Still, an impressive showing, especially for 18-29 year olds.
—
What about those who really cared about experience? Certainly, Hillary Clinton could have at least done decently there, since her whole campaign is predicated on the “experience,” label.
Most Qualified to be Commander-in-Chief
Obama: 46%
Clinton: 35%
Edwards: 19%
So even here, it’s clear that South Carolinians believed Obama to be quite qualified, and so perhaps people looking for qualifications also went for Obama.
The point in throwing out all these numbers is to show you that this win was not about race, although of course race helped. Of course, solidifying the black vote was crucial to his victory. But this was a landslide victory because he did well across racial lines.
Now what about those pesky polls? What did they say?
The average from Pollster, had Clinton at 28.5%, Edwards at 17%, and Obama at 43.1%. How did South Carolina turn out? Clinton 27%, Edwards 17%, and Obama 55%.
The poll averages were within 1.5 percentage points of what actually happened–except for Obama. Somehow, the winner got a huge boost. We saw this same effect in New Hampshire. (See my post on that here.
“Magically,” Clinton had gained 9 points in New Hampshire from what we were predicting. And magically, it seems again, Obama jumped 12% in SC. (At least this time the right person was on top.)
Perhaps it’s that the people who decided late were simply tired of the negativity coming out of the Clinton campaign. Perhaps. And it should obviously be noted that Clinton pulled out of South Carolina (she even gave her concession speech in Tennessee — how rude to her SC workers!), and was moving on to February 5th states. That is certainly part of his boost as well. But I think Matt Stoller’s observation has something to do with it:
So I’ve had a few interesting conversations with local politicos here, and I’m getting something of a fuller picture. The Clinton operation, which I blogged about over the past few days as low energy, didn’t really have much national support. Obama’s people had been organizing and cleaning lists since August, building an organization with real leadership and a genuine organizing base. I hear they had something on the order of 2000-4000 volunteers along with 100-200 paid staff, though those numbers are guesses from professional political people in South Carolina, so take that with a grain of salt.
The Clinton campaign did not have anything close to that, having spent its time organizing in Iowa, New Hampshire and Nevada. And unions were just not a factor, which changes the playing field. While there’s substantial media control over both campaigns, it’s especially bad in the Clinton shop. Organizing takes time and focus, and they are doing things by committee which allows for neither. I don’t have good evidence on Obama, but I do know that they had a great organization here. If the Clinton’s win the primary, get ready for a rehash of Kerry 2.0, with poor planning and decision-making across the board as long as Mark Penn is involved.
That last comment may be a bit of a low blow. But I agree with the thrust of what he noted: Obama organized, and he organized really, really well — in all districts across SC, among all races, and all age groups.
After Nevada, Zack Exley, who (though I’ve never met him) I’m a big fan of, wrote about Clinton’s organization in Nevada:
For the mainstream news media, a few seconds of “tears” or a last minute robo call will always trump the story of a year of meticulous organizing by disciplined armies of young campaign staff and volunteers. Though it’s difficult to report comprehensively on scattered and closed-mouthed presidential field operations, there are reasons to believe that high-quality field organizing has been decisive in the first contests of 2008. This week in Nevada, Obama had a surge in the polls and an endorsement from the powerful Culinary Workers union on his side. Meticulous organizing and good management by the local Clinton Nevada staff have made the difference. …
But the big field story of 2008 is not about the horse race. In the 2008 and 2004 presidential primary cycles, the early states of Iowa and New Hampshire–joined by Nevada and South Carolina this year–have functioned as training grounds for a new generation of field organizers and incubators of new field techniques and technologies. The dramatic surge in early resources available to campaigns has put large staffs on the ground up to one year before voting day. These organizing hothouses–especially on the Democratic side–are producing a new generation of activists who are as disciplined and skilled as they are passionate.
A little after 9:00 PM, in one nightly reporting meeting I witnessed, regional field director Ryan Donohue started with three questions for all his organizers: “Did you have a Caucus 101 meeting today?” “How many people were you expecting to show up?” “How many people did you actually have?” In the case of a discrepancy, organizers were asked to explain what happened. There was the feeling that it was better to have a small number of volunteers and to have predicted turn out correctly, than to have a big unexpected turnout. In other words, as an organizer, this campaign expected you to be in control.
The walls of Donahue’s team office were c
overed with overlapping charts and lists of staff, their precinct captains, and other measures of their progress. But no numbers were put on the wall without a discussion of how they were achieved–and the lessons to be learned from the experience. In these nightly reporting sessions, regional directors went beyond mere numbers to debrief every conversation the organizers held that day with potential campaign workers as well as detailed plans for future recruitment, voter ID, persuasion and organization building. Each reporting session included good-natured self-critique and group-critique of team members’ day-to-day efforts, both successful and unsuccessful. All meetings closed with a “role play” in which one organizer was called upon to lead a mock volunteer house meeting (the mainstay organizing tool of the campaign). The role plays too were followed by self- and group-critique.After organizers had given their reports, they went to work inputing data from the day’s work into “The Donkey,” a new online volunteer management system. Regional directors then gathered in another room to report their teams’ results to the statewide field director, Marlon Marshall, followed by the same process of self- and group-critique and evaluation.
Self-critique. Evaluation. Constant focus on results. Discipline. Meticulous records. That’s what, I believe, brought Clinton her plurality in NV and NH. That’s what really brought Obama home in Iowa and South Carolina.
Now’s the time to get involved and be a part of that organization. Whoever you support, be part of that field operation in Massachusetts because our votes will matter on February 5th. This campaign isn’t about race, it isn’t about age, it’s no longer about inevitability. Who wins isn’t even really about who you personally want to win. It’s about who you’re willing to organize for.
afertig says
Mark Blumenthal makes a good point:
Too bad this isn’t a comeback kid story.
alexwill says
<
p>You mixed up Obama and Edwards in the over-30 non-Black numbers.
afertig says
That’s what I get for writing at 3am.
howardjp says
Got 55%, Gore 18%, Dukakis 7% …..
ryepower12 says
A better example of its importance is our current governor. There’s no way he would have won if not for the fact that he out organized all his primary opponents. Voter ID and GOTV is imperative to a campaign – not only is it a good way to make sure all your supporters actually get out, but it’s a great way to get a campaign’s message spread at the grassroots level. People are a lot more receptive to a campaign’s theme when a volunteer knocks on their door than they are during a Law and Order commercial.
mak says
The pollster numbers only add up to about 89%. The actual votes add up to 99%, based on the quote below. That’s where the magic difference came in it seems. Were the missing 10-12% undecideds?
<
p>”Now what about those pesky polls? What did they say?
<
p>The average from Pollster, had Clinton at 28.5%, Edwards at 17%, and Obama at 43.1%. How did South Carolina turn out? Clinton 27%, Edwards 17%, and Obama 55%.”
afertig says
And one I explored in my previous post as well about the NH polling errors. It’s problematic, though, to assume that almost all undecideds broke for one candidate. From pollster:
political-inaction says
And very readable as well.
<
p>Has anybody seen exit poll numbers on people who voted for the first time in many years (as opposed to those who were only eligible to vote this time?)
<
p>I’m curious how much of Obama’s bump has been from people who “tuned out” over the years but either through his message or their disdain for the current administration (and perhaps Congress, who is suffering similar low support) might be part of the screwy poll numbers.
<
p>Are the skewed numbers due in part to pollsters calling “likely voters” but missing a whole universe of “unlikely voters” that are turning out in masses? Each state so far has seen much larger than usual Democratic voter turnout – seems to me a whole bunch of “unlikely voters” must be turning out, right?